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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 29, 2005, the U,S. Senate confirmed John G. Roberts,
Jr. as ChiefJustice of the U.S. Supreme Court.1 Since then, there have been
two major changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
involving the loss of discoverable electronically stored information
(ESI). 2 These changes primarily address the duties to preserve ESI for
federal civil litigation, the potential procedural law sanctions that judges
can assess against a litigant for preservation failures, and the role of
state substantive spoliation laws in deterring and remedying lost ESL
FRCP 37(e) embodies both of these substantive changes.3 The Rule 37(e)
provisions have always been accompanied by other FRCP provisions on
ESl.4 Some of them predate Rule 37(e). 5 To date, Congress has remained
quiet on lost ESI in federal civil actions.
This Article will review the current FRCP provisions on ESI and the
history behind them, though focusing considerably on the Rule 37
changes that took effect in 2006 and 2015. In doing so, it will also review
the proposed changes to FRCP 37(e) in 2013 that the Federal Civil Rules
Committee did not adopt These reviews will focus on how the FRCP has
addressed lost, discoverable ESL
Initially, the discussions of ESI will separately address the FRCP as
well as state laws on pre-suit ESI losses and post-suit ESI losses. This
Article also reviews state laws, as they may suggest potential FRCP
reforms. A brief survey of state spoliation claims, whether in tort,
contract, or otherwise, will follow as litigants can pursue such claims in
• © 2022. Jeffrey A. Parness. All Rights Reserved. Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois
University College of Law. BA., Colby College; J.D., The University of Chicago. Thanks to Rick Marcus
for guidance on accessing federal judicial rulemaking records.
1. About the Court: Current Members, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2021).
2. See FED. R CIV. P. 37(e) (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (2015).
3. FED. R.CIV. P. 37(e) (the role of state substantive law in federal courtESI issues is addressed
in the Advisory Nate to the rule).
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A), (c); infra note 52.
5. See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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federal courts for either pre-suit or post-suit ESI losses impacting
pending civil actions.
This Article then uses those discussions as the basis for exploring
some of the significant issues that remain regarding lost ESI in federal
civil actions and for suggesting some new approaches. These issues
include the uncertainties arising from the differences between ES! and
non-ES! in the FRCP, as well as the differences between the varying
forms of ESI; the challenges in pursuing and hearing state spoliation
claims in related federal civil actions; and the special issues arising when
nonparties lose discoverable ESL The explorations will lead to some
tentative thoughts on FRCP reforms involving lost ESI that would
prompt greater justice, efficiency, and economy per the mandate of FRCP
1. Possible new approaches include FRCP amendments broadening the
opportunities for pre-suit discovery of ESI and/ or creating new avenues
for pre-suit protective orders on behalf of those possessing or
controlling ESL
II. FEDERAL DISCOVERY LAWS ON LOST ES/

Undertaking affirmative pre-suit discovery and securing defensive
pre-suit protective orders can prevent pre-suit ESI losses. Likewise,
undertaking affirmative post-suit discovery and securing defensive
post-suit protective orders can prevent post-suit ES! losses. When a
potential party to a suit loses discoverable ES! that they should have
maintained or preserved, the court may address the problem by
administering discovery sanctions, regardless of whether the losses
occurred pre-suit or post-suit. On far fewer occasions, it is possible to
address ES! losses through discovery sanctions arising during
affirmative pre-suit discovery or defensive pre-suit protective order
proceedings.
Laws on ESI preservation duties can originate in varying sources,
including court rules, statutes, and case precedents. In some cases, these
laws can operate pre-suit and post-suit. In others they can operate solely
in the context of anticipated civil litigation.
ES! preservation laws can be general or special. The FRCP on presuit testimony perpetuation accomplished through depositions of those
likely to be unavailable later is an example of general laws.6 The FRCP

6. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a) .
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on sanctions for only certain lost ESI provides an illustration of special
laws.7
The following two sections will generally explore federal and state
discovery laws on pre-suit and post-suit ESI losses. These sections also
include a review of comparative state law, as they may suggest possible
FRCP reforms. This exploration will then guide the later consideration
of possible new FRCP approaches to lost ESI, as will the upcoming survey
of state spoliation claims involving ESI losses.
A. Explicit Laws on Pre-suit ESI Losses

Greater opportunities for affirmative pre-suit discovery can
mitigate ESI losses in advance of civil litigation that later prompts
discovery problems in related civil actions. Pre-suit opportunities under
the FRCP involving information maintenance, preservation, and
production relevant to future civil actions, however, are quite limited. A
few American states have more expansive pre-suit discovery
opportunities.
FRCP 27(a) is the major explicit federal rule on affirmative pre-suit
discovery. In one part it authorizes testimony perpetuation via
deposition "about any matter cognizable in a United States court" where
the petitioner "expects to be a party" to an action in a U.S. court, but
"cannot presently'' sue.s Under this rule, a court can only order a
deposition to "prevent a failure or delay of justice." 9 In seeking a
deposition, a petitioner can also request that the deponent produce
documents and other tangible items at the deposition or submit to a
physical or mental examination. 10 Thus, such a deposition can secure ESI
for later related litigation. The court can also sanction a party in
contempt proceedings if it fails to abide by FRCP 27(a).11
Many states have procedural laws permitting testimony and other
evidence perpetuations through pre-suit depositions.12 Failures to
7. FED. R. c,v. P. 37(e) (non-restorable and irreplaceable).
8. FED. R. C1v. P. 27(a)(1)(A). Beyond testimony perpetuation via deposition under FRCP 27,
there is little else in the FRCP or the U.S. Judicial Code on pre-suit opportunities to preserve
discoverable information, excepting the recognition under FRCP 27(c) of "a court's power to
entertain an action to perpetuate testimony." FED. R. C1v. P. 27(c).
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(3).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(3) (referencing FED. R. CIV. P. 34, 35).
11. FED. R. C1v. P. 45(g) (failure to obey a deposition subpoena or a related court order).
12. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1); MINN. R. C1v. P. 27.01; MISS. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-156(a)(1)(A) (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 15-6-27(a)(1)(A) (2021); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1)(A);
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1)(1); NEB. SUP. CT. R. DISC.§ 6-327(a)(1)(i); s.c. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1)(1); W.VA.
R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1)(1). But see ILL. SUP. CT. R. 217(a)(l) (no need to show petitioner cannot currently
sue); MD. R. 2-404(a)(2); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-18-12 (2021); WIS.STAT.§ 804.02(1)(a) (2021). Special
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comply with legitimate affirmative pre-suit discovery requests can
prompt procedural law sanctions.13
The federal rule governing a pre-suit deposition to perpetuate
testimony "does not limit a court's power to entertain an action to
perpetuate testimony," 14 a power substantially defined by "the former
bill in equity to perpetuate testimony." 15 Use of such a bill predates the
FRCP16 and is recognized in FRCP 27(c).17 Current usage of the bill in
equity has been read to track the FRCP requirements on deposition
testimony perpetuation,tB but this usage is infrequent.19 As with
testimony perpetuation, there are cmr~parable state laws that recognize
independent pre-suit discovery opportunities,20 and compliance failures
can prompt procedural law sanctions.
state laws can also operate, as with a Missouri statute on perpetuating testimony by deposition says
that where "the object is to perpetuate the contents of any lost deed or other instrument of writing
and the remembrance of any fact, matter or thing necessary to the recovery, security, or defense of
any estate or property, real or personal, or any interest therein, or any other personal right." Mo.
REV. STAT. § 492.420 (2020); see also MONT. WATER RIGHT ADJUDICATION R. 28 (providing that
testimony perpetuation via deposition "regarding the historical beneficial use of any water right
claim" includes "a verified petition with the water court," with "notice to expected adverse
parties ... served by mail to the most recently updated address documented in the [water]
department's centralized record system").
13. Sanctions will often flow from contempt proceedings under state laws, much like FRCP
45(g), which authorizes contempt holdings against those who "fail without adequate excuse" to
obey deposition-related orders. FED. R. Clv. P. 45(g).
14. FED. R. Ctv. P. 27(c).
15. See, e.g .• Shore v. Acands, Inc., 644 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1981).
16. See, e.g.• Rindskopf v. Platto, 29 F. 130, 130 (E.D. Wis. 1886) (involving an equity discovery
bill where a related-law action between the same parties was pending); Preston v. Equity Sav. Bank,
287 F. 1003, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (rejecting "the contention ... that discovery can only be had" in
a pending suit on the grounds that discovery is "an original and inherent power of a court of
equity").
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 27(c).
18. See, e.g., Shore, 644 F.2d at 389 (citing JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
'If 27.21 (2d ed. 1979)); see also Rule 34(c) and Discovery of Non Party land, BS YALE L.J. 112, 114
(1975); Lubrin v. Hess Oil Virgin Island Corp., 109 F.R.D. 403, 405 (D.V.I. 1986) (noting that most
cases find that an "independent action to obtain discovery" of documents and other evidence from
a nonparty is similar "to the antiquated instrument called an equitable bill of discovery").
19. A recent newsworthy state case illustrates an effective use of a bill. The case involved Dr.
David Dao's petition seeking to preserve United Airlines' records shortly after Dr. Dao was
involuntarily removed from a United flight See Jeffrey A. Parness & Jessica Theodoratos, Expanding
Pre-suit Discovery, Production and Preservation Orders, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 651, 655 (bill regarding
airline records granted per party agreement). For an older case see lubrin, 109 F.R.D. at 405
(preservation of conditions at site of accident). Of course, private pre-suit agreements or unilateral
assumptions of information preservation duties lessen the need for pre-suit equitable discovery
bills. Such agreements and assumptions are promoted; whereas, petitions for pre-suit equitable
discovery bills beyond testimony perpetuation via pre-suit discovery must be preceded by a "meet
and confer." Parness & Theodoratos, supra note 19, at 681.
20. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 27(c); KAN. STAT.ANN.§ 60-227(d) (2021); MISS. R. C1v. P. 27(a)(l); NEB. CT.
R. Disc.§ 6-327(c); S.C. R. CIV. P. 27(c); see also MINN. R. Clv. P. 34.03(b) (finding no preclusion of "an
independent action against a person not a party for production of documents and things and
permission to enter land"). But see Mo. R. 2-404; CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 52-156a (2021); S.D. CODIFIED
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Some state civil procedure discovery laws permit greater
opportunities for affirmative pre-suit discovery.21 Here, too, a party may
seek ESI. Federal laws allow depositions and related information
productions and inspections of nonparties where pending civil actions
involving others exist, 22 although they are pre-suit from the deponents'
perspectives. An Illinois statute makes different pre-suit discovery from
nonparties in pending civil actions available,23 by authorizing discovery
by a plaintiff from a nonparty respondent "believed by the plaintiff to
have information essential to the determination of who should properly
be named as additional defendants ...."2 4
Some state civil procedure discovery laws also reach beyond FRCP
27 by allowing pre-suit information maintenance, preservation, and
production orders where the purpose is not testimony perpetuation. 25
Sometimes there is no pending related civil action. In Illinois, a court rule
authorizes an "independent action" by a potential claimant for "the sole
purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who may be responsible in
damages." 26 In New York, a statute permits pre-suit discovery to assist
with bringing an action.27 In Ohio, a civil procedure rule allows pre-suit
discovery "necessary to ascertain the identity of a potential adverse
party."2e
Related to these laws on identifying potential defendants, some
states have pre-suit civil discovery laws aiding petitioners seeking to

LAWS§ 15-6-27(a) (2021); ALASKA R CIV. P. 27 (court rules and statutes on perpetuating witness
testimony via pre-suit depositions where there are no recognitions of "independent" actions) .
21. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402(a) (2021); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(a)(1); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102(c)
(MCKINNEY 2021); OHIO R. C!V. P. 34(D)(3)(a)-(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2317.48 (West 2021); TEX.
R. C1v. P. 176.2, 199.3, 202.1, 202.4(a), 202.5.
22. FED. R. C1v. P. 30(a)(1) (allowing deposition by oral questions of any person including a
party); FED. R. C1v. P. 34(c) ("[A] nonparty may be compelled to produce documents and tangible
things or to permit an inspection" per FED. R. CIV. P. 45.); FED. R. Ctv. P. 45(c)(1), (2) (providing a
subpoena commanding a person to attend a deposition may also command production of ESI,
tangible things, or an inspection).
23. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402(a) (2021). See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102(c) (MCKINNEY 2021)
(allowing pre-suit discovery "to aid in bringing an action").
24. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402(a).
25. See, e.g., id.; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102(c) (MCKINNEY 2021).
26. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(a)(1); see, e.g., Dentv. Constellation New Energy, Inc., No.1-9-1652, 2020
WL 6939551, at *11, *13 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 25, 2020).
27. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102(c) (MCKINNEY 2021).
28. OHIO R. C1v. P. 34(D)(3)(a)-(b); see also Bay EMM Vay Store, Inc., v. BMW Fin. Servs. N.A.,
116 N.E.3d 858, 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (finding that petitioner must also be "otherwise unable to
bring the contemplated action"); White v. Equity, Inc., 899 N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ohio Ct App. 2008)
(demonstrating the rule may be employed even where a later claim would be subject to contractual
arbitration); Benner v. Walker Ambulance Co., 692 N.E.2d 1053, 1054 (Ohio Ct App. 1997)
( discussing how the new rule supplements a pre-suit discovery statute aimed at identifying
potential causes of action and was promulgated in response to a case interpreting the statute.).
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identify potential causes of actions.2 9 Here, potential defendants may be
known, but their roles-if any-in causing harm are unknown and may
not become known without pre-suit discovery. A Texas rule illustrates
this concept, allowing a petition seeking a deposition authorization in
order "to investigate a potential claim or suit," as it recognizes judicial
authority where there is only an "anticipated suit."3o Under this rule, a
petitioner must demonstrate that the deposition order "may prevent a
failure or delay of justice" (like FRCP 27(a) requisite) or that "the likely
benefit" of the deposition "outweighs the burden or expense of the
procedure."3 1 "[T]he rules applicable to depositions of nonparties in a
pending suit" govern authorized depositions 32 so that litigants can seek
ESI production.33
A New York statute is broader, as it authorizes varying pre-suit
discovery devices, including depositions, interrogatories, physical and
mental examinations, and requests for admission "to aid in bringing an
action."34 An Ohio statute allows "a person claiming to have a cause of
action" who is "unable to file his complaint" without discovery "from the
adverse party" to "bring an action for discovery . . . with any
interrogatories ... that are necessary to procure the discovery sought."3s
As with pre-suit discovery failures under FRCP 27(a) and (c),
sanctions may follow failures under these state pre-suit discovery laws.
Sanctions can involve contempt orders, as when deposition failures
occur when there is no pending related civil action under state laws that

29. See Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Pre-suit Discovery, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 43,
43 (2010) (advocating for greater pre-suit discovery in order to assist aspiring claimants to secure
information needed under heightened pleading standards); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to
Information, Access to justice: The Role of Pre-Suit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
217, 217 (2007) (advocating for expanding pre-suit discovery laws in order to promote greater
access to justice for those with claims but limited resources).
30. See TEX. R. C1v. P. 202.1 (providing that conditions limiting post-lawsuit depositions can also
limit pre-suit depositions). The potential availability of this rule in a federal district court is
discussed in Jeffrey Liang, Reverse Erie and Texas Rule 202: The Federal Implications ofTexos PreSuit Discovery, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 1491, 1491-92 (2011).
31. TEX.R. C1v. P. 202.4(a).See also In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. App. 2006)
( discussing how benefits do not outweigh burdens, especially as trade secrets were involved).
32. TEX. R. C!V. P. 202.5.
33. See TEX. R. C1v. P. 176.2, 199.3. A subpoena for an oral deposition can include a command to
"produce and permit inspection and copying of designated documents or tangible things." TEX. R.
C1v. P. 176.2(b). The history behind the Texas pre-suit discovery rule is reviewed in In re Doe, 444
S.W.3d 603, 605-08 (Tex. 2014).
34. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102(a), (c) (MCKINNEY 2021).
35. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.48 (2021). The statute "occupies a small niche between an
unacceptable 'fishing expedition' and a short and plain statement of a complaint or a defense."
Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co., 541 N.E.2d 1031, 1034 (Ohio 1989).
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are similar to FRCP 45(g).3 6 Sanctions beyond contempt are available for
failures occurring in pending civil actions under state laws like FRCP 37.
Beyond affirmative pre-suit discovery, the prevention of ESI (and
other information) losses, in advance ofrelated civil actions containing
contested substantive civil claims for relief, can be obtained through
protective orders which judicially set out information maintenance and
preservation (though no current production) duties. Few laws authorize
such pre-suit protective orders. One major law is Arizona Civil
Procedure Rule 45.2, first effective in 2018.37 The rule allows judicial
resolutions of pre-suit disputes over the existence of any "duty to
preserve" ESl.38 A nonparty in a pending civil action who has received an
ESI request for preservation related to that action may seek a "protective
order" in that action in order to resolve disputes over the alleged duty
prompting the request. 39 One who receives a preservation request
where there is no pending action may also seek a protective order.4o
8. Other Laws on Pre-Suit and Post-Suit ESI Losses
Special federal discovery laws, within FRCP 3 7 ( e), address
sanctions for ESI losses relevant to pending civil actions, but these
special discovery laws only cover certain ESL Other FRCP provisions are
more general in nature, covering both other lost ESI and lost non-ESl.41
In all settings, sanctions can be founded on information losses occurring
either pre-suit or during the pendency of a case.
Under the 2015 amendments to the FRCP, discovery sanctions are
specifically available under Rule 37(e) where certain ESI "that should
have been preserved in the anticipation ... of litigation is lost because a
party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be
restored or replaced through additional discovery."42 Separate FRCP
provisions authorize discovery sanctions involving pre-suit losses of
other ESI (e.g., non-restorable and irreplaceable) and non-ESl.43 These
36. See, e.g., OHIO R. CIV. P. 45(E).
37. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2.
38. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(a).
39. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(d)(2) (guidelines for such orders are in ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26(e)); ARIZ. R. CIV.
P. 7.l(h) (requiring attachment ofa good faith consultation certificate indicating attempts to resolve
the disputes when required by the rules).
40. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(e)(l) (guidelines for such orders are in ARIZ. R. CIV. P.45.2(e)(l)(A)-(E)).
41. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A), (c).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (providing harsher sanctions available for intentional deprivations).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) (imposing sanctions for failing to obey a court order); FED. R. CIV. P.
37(c)(l) (imposing sanctions for failing to provide information in a required disclosure). To prevent
unwarranted pre-suit information losses by lawyers, Professor Schaefer has proposed amendments
to FRCP 26(a)(l) on initial disclosures that would require that "a party" provide to "other parties ...
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provisions are employed to sanction those responsible for pre-suit ESI
losses, but they do not explicitly address pre-suit conduct like FRCP
27(a) and 27(c).44
Some current state civil procedure laws similarly differentiate
between the preservation duties involving certain ESI and non-ESI,
which are enforceable through sanctions in post-suit settings.45 Other
state discovery laws speak more generally by addressing information
preservation duties for all forms of information, including all ESI and
non-ESl. 46
Beyond FRCP 37(e), other special FRCP sanction laws can operate
on ESI losses in pending actions. For example, ESI losses that
"unreasonably and vexatiously" multiply a federal civil action can
prompt an attorney or other culprit to be assessed attorneys' fees.47
General federal civil procedure laws on sanctions involving lost
discoverable information beyond FRCP 3 7 (e) ESI are chiefly
encompassed in FRCP 37 outside of Rule 37(e). Some general state
discovery laws are comparable.4B
The differentiation in FRCP 37 between some ESI and other ESI is
relatively recent. Before 2006, unavailable ESI and non-ESI were
addressed in a comparable manner.49 Thus, since 1993 Rule 37(c) has
said that a party who "fails to provide information ... is not allowed to
use that information ... to supply evidence ... unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless." 50 In situations where the jury
a description of the steps taken to preserve discoverable information in the case." Paula Schaefer,
Attorney Negligence and Negligent Spoliation: The Need for New Tools to Prompt Attorney
Competence in Preservation, 51 AKRON L. REV. 607, 631 (2017) (focusing on incentivizing attorney
competence r egarding information preservation via amendments to compelled disclosure rules) .
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 27.
45. See, e.g., WYO. R. C1v. P. 37; D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 37; ALA. R. C1v. P. 37(g); MINN. R. CIV. P.
37.05. A call and rationale for Georgia to follow FRCP 37(e) is found in Matthew C. Daigle, Georgia's
Approach to Proportionality and Sanctions for the Spoliation of Electronically Stored Information, 3 7
GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 603, 607 (2021). But see VT. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (the Vermont rule includes only the
initial portion of FRCP 37(e), so it does not speak directly to intentional acts).
46. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219. The Advisory Committee Comments to Rule 219 say, "the rule
is sufficient to cover sanction issues as they relate to electronic discovery." ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219
advisory committee's note to Rule 219.
47. 28U.S.C. §1927.
48. See, e.g., VT. R. C1v. P. 37; ME. R. C1v. P. 37 (containing no provision like FRCP 37(1) on failing
to participate in framing a discovery plan); D.C. SUP. CT. R. C1v. P. 37 [no discovery plan provision);
ALA. R. CIV. P. 37 (no discovery plan provision); N.D. R. C1v. P. 37; OHIO R. Crv. P. 37 [no discovery plan
provision). But see ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137, 219 [providing conduct prompting possible discovery
sanctions governed by same standards governing pleading and motion sanctions, unlike FRCP
11(d)). Per Illinois Rule 219(c), there is no voluntary dismissal "to avoid compliance with discovery
deadlines, orders or applicable rules." ILL SUP. CT. R. 219(c).
49. Jeffrey A. Parness, Lost EST Under the Federal Rules a/Civil Procedure, 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 25, 26 (2017).
50. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1).
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learns of a "party's failure" or in cases where other sanctions are
considered to be "more appropriate," a party could use this
information.st Rule 37(a)(3)(A) dictates that a party who "fails to make
a disclosure" required pursuant to FRCP 26(a) may be subject to
"appropriate sanctions." 52 A failure to provide or to "make a disclosure"
includes information losses occurring pre-suit.53
In 2006, a new FRCP 37(t) addressed certain unavailable ESl.54 It
lasted until 2015,55 though some state civil procedure laws still follow
its norms.s6 Under the 2006 version of the rule, when the court makes a
"finding of 'exceptional circumstances,"' it can assess sanctions on a
party for losing ESI, even if it was due to "the routine, good-faith

51. Parness, supra note 49, at 26; FED. R. C1v. P. 37(c)(1)(B), (CJ.
52. Parness, supra note 49, at 26; FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a), 37(a)(3)(A).
53. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(a)(3)(A), (c)(1). lnherentjudicial powers are often employed to sanction
pre-suit information losses. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590, 595 (4th Cir.
2001) ( holding that involuntary dismissal oflawsuit was not an unduly harsh sanction arising from
a discovery violation involving the pre-suit failure to preserve a car); see also Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Winston Co., No. 09-cv-5088, 2011 WL 13382162, at *6 (N.D. III. May 18, 2011) ("[T]he analysis
for imposing sanctions under our inherent powers and Rule 37 is essentially the same."). On the
general inapplicability of FRCP 37 to pre-suit information losses, see lain D. Johnston, Federal
Courts' Authorit;y to Impose Sanctions for Prelitigation or Pre-Order Spoliation ofEvidence, 156 F.R.D.
313, 325 (1994) ("As a general principle, Rule 37, except when the precise terms of Rule 37(d) are
applicable, does not appear to be up to the task of providing an efficient source of authority for
prelitigation or pre-order spoliation of evidence."). Now District Judge Johnston found that "federal
courts are divided as to the appropriate source" for remedying pre-suit and pre-order evidence
spoliation. Id. at 315, 318 n.39, 322 n.69.
54. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. R OF CIV. PRO., REPORT OF THE CIV. R. ADVISORY COMM., at 54 (2004)
(Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 2005 FRCP 37(F) SUMMARY] (indicating the Advisory Committee
on Civil Procedure Rules presented to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
two alternative versions of a proposed new FRCP 37(f), neither of which was, in fact, what became
2006 FRCP 37(f)). Alternative 1 from the Advisory Committee did not contain the "absent
exceptional circumstances" language that limited available sanctions nor the explicit requirement
of the "good-faith" operation of an ES[ system, though it recognized "reasonable steps to preserve"
ESl were required when related litigation was reasonably foreseeable. Id. Alternative 2 limited
sanctions for deleted or lost ESI to settings where there was "intentional or reckless" conduct, but
it contained neither the "exceptional circumstances" nor the "good-faith" language. Id. at 57.
55. Effective December 1, 2007, FRCP 37(f) was renumbered to FRCP 37(e), remaining so until
2015. Herein, the provisions of FRCP 37(e) from 2007 to 2015 will be referenced as the 2006 FRCP
37(f) since there were no substantive changes to FRCP 37(e) in 2007. See FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e)
advisory committee's note to 2007 amendment
56. While the 2006 rule operated in the federal district courts for only nine years, it has been
adopted and continues to operate in several different state courts. See, e.g., MD. R. 2-433(b); N.C. R.
CIV. P. 37(b)(1); MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(e); OHIO R. CIV. P. 37(E); VT. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (2009); MINN. R. CIV. P.
37.05; TENN. R. CIV. P. 37.06; KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 60-237(e) (2021); HAW. R. CIV. P. 37(f); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 4:23-6 (2021); and ALASKA R. C1v. P. 37(g); see also UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(e) (adoption of2006 FRCP
37(e) accompanied by an explicit recognition of continuing "inherent" judicial power to deal with
lost ESI or non-ES[ "in violation of a duty" to preserve); OHIO R. C1v. P. 37(F) (a 2008 rule that, in
addition to adding 2006 FRCP 37(e), sets out five factors that courts may consider when
determining whether to sanction). But see ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 37(g) (containing 2015 FRCP 37(e), but
also articulating the parameters of the "duty to take reasonable steps to preserve" ESI and
guidelines on what constitutes such steps).
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operation of an electronic information system."s1 Such a system included
"a distinctive feature of computer operations" that prompts "the routine
alteration and deletion of information that attends ordinary use." 58
Routine operation embodied "the alteration and overwriting of
information, often without the operator's specific direction or
awareness," serving "the party's technical and business needs."59 Good
faith included a party's intervention to modify or suspend certain
features of the "routine operation to prevent the loss of information ...
subject to a preservation obligation," which could arise from "common
law, statutes, regulations, or a court order."60
Under the 2006 FRCP 37(f), some ESI is not subject to "routine
alteration and deletion," attending "ordinary use."61 Further, some ESI
that is subject to a routine operation is unrelated to "technical and
business needs."62
The 2006 FRCP 37(t) flowed from a 2004 Civil Rules Advisory
Committee report that contained two alternative rule amendments,
neither of which were fully adopted. 63 Each alternative had the 2006
FRCP 37(f) "exceptional circumstances" language.64 One of the proposed
rule amendments authorized sanctions for ESI "routine operation"
losses only if the party did not take "reasonable steps to preserve."65 The
other authorized sanctions for ESI "routine operation" losses or
deletions only if the party acted intentionally or recklessly.66
Between 2006-2015, FRCP 37(e) distinguished ESI from non-ESI,
and some procedural laws since that time have made the same
distinction.67 Since 2006, FRCP 26(b)(2)(8) has read, "a party need not
provide discovery of [ESI] from sources that the party identifies as not
57. Parness, supra note 49, at 26-27 (quoting FED. R. c,v. P. 37(f) (2006)).
58. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
59. Id. Thus, the rule makers sought to protect those who "lose potentially discoverable
information without culpable conduct." Id. Unlike document destruction, ESI loss was recognized as
subject to system operation "without the operator's specific direction or awareness." Id. One
alternative proposal to the 2006 FRCP 37(e) forbade sanctions for failing to provide in discovery
"deleted or lost" ESI "unless the deletion or loss was intentional or reckless." SEPTEMBER 2005 FRCP
37(F) SUMMARY, supra note 53, at 57.
60. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e), advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment. (explaining that a
preservation duty could arise due to "pending or reasonably anticipated litigation").
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. SEPTEMBER 2005 FRCP 37(F) SUMMARY, supra note 53, at 54, 57.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 54.
66. Id. at 57. While all Committee members favored publishing Alternative 1, they were "closely
divided" on whether to publish Alternative 2. Id. at 54. The history behind these and earlier ESI
discovery reform efforts appears in Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking
Responses to E-Discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2004).
67. Parness, supra note 49, at 27.
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reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost," a burden
carried by that party, unless "the requesting party shows good cause."6B
FRCP 26(f) has said since 1993 that a "discovery plan," which is now
mandatory, "must state ... any issues about disclosure, discovery, or
preservation of [ESI], including the form or forms in which it should be
produced."69 Additionally, FRCP 34(b)(2)(E) says, and has said since
2006, that a party may object to the form in which the opposing party
requests that it produce ESl.70
Between 2006 and 2015, other federal discovery rules treated ESI
and non-ESI in the same manner.71 Thus, "[s]ince 2006, the rule on
required disclosures has spoken of providing a copy or description of
certain 'documents, electronically stored information and tangible
things' in the disclosing party's 'possession, custody, or control."'72From
2006 until the present time, the rule for requests for production has
similarly required that the party who receives the request produce "any
designated documents or electronically stored information . . . from
which information can be obtained."73 Documents and ESI are treated
similarly under this rule for a party responding to a production
request. 74
The federal judicial rule makers received concerns from "litigants
and potential litigants" following the 2006 version of FRCP 37(e)
regarding an increase in preservation problems.7s "[T]he increasing
burden of preserving information for litigation, particularly with regard
to electronically stored information," was the subject of most of these
concerns.76 The federal rule makers noted confusion and uncertainty
among "potential parties" as to what the preservation standard would
require of them due to the "[s]ignificant divergences among federal
courts across the country."77
The Committee proposed amendments to FRCP 37(e) as a solution
to this problem.78 These amendments "would establish 'a uniform set of
68. Id. (quoting FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(2)(B)).
69. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D).
71. Parness. supra note 49, at 27.
72. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.26(a)(1)(A)(ii)).
73. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.34(a)(1)(A)).
74. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E).
75. Parness, supra note 49, at 27; ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CIV. PROC., REP. TO THE
STANDING COMMITTEE, at44 (2013) (Comm. Rep.) [hereinafter 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL].
76. 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 44.
77. Id.; Parness, supra note 49, at 28.
78. Parness, supra note 49, at 28. Some of the rulemaking events leading to the 2015 FRCP
37(e) are described in a Memorandum to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure from the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Memorandum from
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guidelines for ... all discoverable information,' not just [ESI]," when a
party breaches information preservation duties that many courts
recognize. 79 The link between ESI and an "electronic information
system" that once existed under the 2006 FRCP 37(f) no longer existed
in the Federal Rules.eo
"Upon breach of [FRCP] 37(e), the 2013 proposal envisioned
possible 'additional discovery ... curative measures, or ... reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure."'01 Other
sanctions, or "adverse-inference" jury instructions, could follow a
breach, but onlr where (1) "a party's actions 'caused substantial
prejudice ... and were willful or in bad faith,"'02 or (2) "a breach
'irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful opportunity' to
litigate." 83 The proponents suggested "factors" within a new Rule 37(e)
on how judicial assessments would be made of "a party's conduct''
causing a breach of the duty to preserve information.84 The 2013 FRCP
37(e) proposal did not directly define the preservation duty.es
The Advisory Committee did not adopt the 2013 proposal.B6 The
flurry of public comments in response to the call for comments on the
May 2013 FRCP 3 7 (e) proposal, sent out in August 2013, prompted some
rethinking by the Committee; the Committee then set forth a report with
a new suggested FRCP 37(e) on May 2, 2014.87 The advisory committee

Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rule of Civ. Pro., to Hon. Jeffery S. Sutton,
Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. & Proc. (Dec. 5, 2012) (noting at 4-5 that in September
2011, the committee presented "three general models of possible rule-amendment approaches" to
the 2006 FRCP 37(e)) [hereinafter Federal Rule Advisory Committee Chair Memorandum] .
79. Federal Rules Advisory Committee Chair Memorandum, supra note 78, at 45; 2013 FRCP
37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 44-45.
BO. Parness, supra note 49, at 28; SEPTEMBER 2005 FRCP 37(F) SUMMARY, supra note 53, at 55.
As noted earlier, the 2006 FRCP 37(f) was renumbered, without substantive changes, to FRCP 37(e)
in 2007; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (2007).
81. Parness, supra note 49, at 28 (quoting 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 43).
82. Id. (quoting 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 43).
83. Id. (quoting 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 43). This was intended to be a
"more demanding" test than the 2006 rule norm on "substantial prejudice." 2013 FRCP 37(E)
PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 48.
84. 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 43-44; Parness, supra note 49, at 28.
85. See 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 45 (noting that the "preservation
obligation . . . has been recognized by many court decisions" and further explaining that proposed
FRCP 37(e)(2), on factors relevant to "assessing a party's conduct," identifies "many of the factors
that should be considered in determining, in the circumstances of a particular case, when a duty to
preserve arose and what information should have been preserved"). But see A. Benjamin Spencer,

The Preservation Obligation: Regulating and Sanctioning Pre-Litigation Spoliation In Federal Court,

79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2022-24 (2011) (proposing amendments to FRCP 37(e) that would
establish the preservation obligations).
86. Parness, supra note 49, at 28.
87. ADVISORY COMM. ON C1v. RULES, REPORT TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE, at 35-46 (2014) (Comm.
Rep.) [hereinafter 2014 ADVISORY COMM. REPORT] .
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presented its report at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure in Washington, D.C., on May 29-30, 2014,
which led to the 2015 FRCP 37(e).BB
2015 FRCP 37(e) speaks to a party's loss of ESI that "should have
been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation," and thus
goes beyond the "routine operation" of an "electronic information
system" under the 2006 FRCP 37(t).B9 The rule contemplates curative
measures for lost ESI that is irreplaceable and non-restorable,9o but it
does not require "exceptional circumstances."91 It does recognize
broader curative measures for more culpable deprivations of ESl,92 but
it does not expressly authorize noncurative sanctions, even for

88. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., MAY 29-30 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AGENDA BOOK, at 306-17
(2014) (explaining the new thinking) [hereinafter MAY 2014 AGENDA BooK]; see also 2014ADVISORY
COMM. REP., supra note 87. For the 2014 proposed rule, which became 2015 FRCP 37(e), see MAY
2014 AGENDA BOOK at 318-23. The 2013 proposed rule, published for comment in August 2013, is
found at MAY 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 86, at 324-30. 2015 FRCP 37(e) is generally reviewed
in Parness, supra note 49, at 25-26.
89. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
90. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) (dealing with lost ESI that "cannot be restored or replaced through
additional discovery"). The Committee Note indicates that restoration/replacement will not be
expected if the required additional discovery is "not reasonably accessible because of undue burden
or cost." MAY 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 88, at 454 (referencing FRCP 26(b)(2)(B) which limits
discovery of non-accessible ESI). In assessing burden and cost, the notes caution that any efforts to
restore or replace ESI "should be proportional to the apparent importance of the lost information
to claims or defenses in the litigation." Id. at 320 (citing FED. R. C1v. P. 26(c)(l)(B)). The 2013
Proposal on FRCP 37(e) did not distinguish between some and other ESI, or between ESI and nonESI. 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 43. When the Advisory Committee solicited
comments on whether Rule 37(e) should be "limited to sanctions for loss" ofESI, it observed that
the "dividing line between [ESI] and other discoverable matter may be uncertain, and [it] may
become more uncertain in the future." Id. at 50. It further observed that "loss of tangible things or
documents important in litigation is a recurrent concern in litigation." Id. But see ALA. R. C1v. P.
26(b)(2)(a), (b) (providing a more elaborate description of relevant factors in and process for
determining whether sources ofESI are "reasonably accessible").
91. These differences are not always recognized or deemed significant. See, e.g., GonzalezBermudez v. Abbott Labs PR Inc., 214 F. Supp. 3d 130, 161 n.10 (D.P.R. 2016) (explaining new FRCP
37(e) has "substantially similar" considerations on imposition of sanctions as did the former rule).
92. FED. R. C1v. P. 3 7( e) (2) (stating actions with "intent to deprive another party of information's
use in litigation" may result in a court ordering curative measures).
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intentional ESI losses.93 It does not address ESI lost by a non-party from
whom discovery is sought94
A reason given for greater limits on judicial responses to lost ESI as
opposed to lost non-ESI was "to reduce the costly over-preservation that
had been emphasized by many," with the goal of reducing "the incentives
for over-preservation."95 Yet this rationale was accompanied by the
recognition that "the savings to be achieved from reducing overpreservation are quite uncertain," with the result that "seriously limiting
trial court discretion" was unjustified,96 though foreclosing non-curative
measures limited discretion for ESI losses by parties, i~ not nonparties.
The Advisory Notes Committee stated that the 2015 FRCP 37(e) on
non-restorable and irreplaceable ESI foreclosed "reliance on inherent
authority or state law" to determine when certain measures should be
used97 in addressing unavailable information, with the goal of reducing,
if not eliminating, the "significantly different standards" within the
circuits.98 Curative measures addressing lost ESI depend on finding a
breach of the federal "common-law duty" regarding the preservation of
relevant information when litigation is reasonably foreseeable or
pending,99 a duty that applies comparably to federal question and
nonfederal question claims, and for ESI and non-ESI.
93. FED. R. C!V. P. 37(e)(1) (Upon finding prejudice arising from lost ESI, "the court may order
measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice."); see also 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL,
supra note 75, at 43 (For failure to preserve, "the court may ... permit additional discovery, order
curative measures, or order the party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
caused by the failure."). The limitation on sanctions under the 2015 FRCP 37(e) was intended to
"reduce the costly over-preservation that had been emphasized by many" commentators on the
proposed rule. MAY 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 88, at 309. On assessing curative discovery
measures addressing intentional deprivations of ESI use in litigation under FRCP 37(e)(2), see
Thomas Y. Allman, Informing Juries About Spoliation of Electronic Evidence After Amended Rule
37(e): An Assessment, 13 FED. CTS. L. REV. 81, 82-83 (2021).
94. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules did note that most ESI will be "stored somewhere
in the 'cloud' ... complicating the preservation task," presumedly because nonparties control this
cloud. MAY 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 88, at 309.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. The Committee Note to the 2013 FRCP 37(e) Proposal pursued similar goals. See 2013 FRCP
37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 45.
98. FED. R. C!V. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
99. Id. As the 2015 rule "does not attempt to create a new duty to preserve," seemingly, as
under the 2006 rule, a preservation duty can arise from statutes, regulations, or court orders. Id.;
see, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting federal, not
New York, spoliation pri nciples apply during a discovery dispute in a products-liability case arising
from a New York accident). As to when a pre-lawsuit duty to preserve arises, one court has gone so
far (and too far) as to say, "any time a party receives notification that litigation is likely to
commence." Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Platform Advert., Inc., No. 14-cv-02464, 2016 WL 492743, at •5
(D. Kan. 2016) (involving a cease-and-desist letter which was acknowledged and acted upon within
a few days). A worthy suggestion for codifying the pre-suit information preservation duty (within
FRCP 37) appears in Spencer, supra note 85, at 2023-24. But see Joshua M. Koppel, Federal Common
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While state laws on curative measures or other sanctions within a
federal civil action against a party who loses FRCP 37(e) ESI are not to
be employed, an "independent tort claim for spoliation" may be used. 100
FRCP 37(e) explicitly covers ESI that "should have been preserved in the
anticipation or conduct of litigation." 1 01 One often can pursue a state
spoliation claim for lost ESI before or during federal civil litigation. A
state spoliation claim may operate where there are no available Rule
37(e) sanctions, as when a spoliation tort does not require-as does a
FRCP 3 7 (e) sanction-a failure "to take reasonable steps to preserve" 102
or when lost ESI triggers strict liability under a state information
preservation statute.103
The employment of the FRCP on curative measures or other
sanctions for lost discoverable information, including all ESI and nonESI then unavailable in a pending civil case, should be guided not only
by the FRCP on pre-suit and post-suit discovery, but also by the
opportunities for other information gathering- for example, Freedom
of Information Actrn4 requests, information preservation demand
letters, and informal information requests that would have been
honored. So, sanctions involving then unavailable information should be
less available, if available at all, where lost information could have been
secured easily under FRCP discovery norms or under informal
discovery.
III. STATE SUBSTANTIVE SPOLIATION LAWS FOR ES/ LOSSES IN
FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION

Beyond discovery sanctions for pre-suit or post-suit ESI losses,
federal district courts can hear claims on state substantive spoliation
laws involving lost ESL These laws typically recognize damage claims for
harms caused by pre-suit and post-suit information losses. Harms can
involve diminished or eliminated opportunities to present civil claims or
law and the Courts' Regulation of Pre-litigation Preservation, 1 STAN. J. OF COMPLEX LITIG. 102, 10203 (2012) (suggesting that with both federal question and state law claims, federal courts employ
state pre-suit preservation laws and advocating for a model state law to move states toward
uniformity).
100. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
101. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1 (2021) (hospital duty to keep certain X-rays). Compare
Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Decatur, 149 Ill. 2d 302, 309 (1992) (implied cause of action arises
from statute, to be governed by principles of negligence (per se) or strict liability), with Howard
Reg'! Health Sys. v. Gordon, 952 N.E.2d 182, 182 (Ind. 2011) (no implied cause ofaction arising from
violation of the statute on maintenance of health care records).
104. 5 u.s.c. § 552.
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defenses.ms They may arise from general or special laws.106 These laws
complement, but may impact the use of, the federal ESI discovery
sanction laws. Spoliation laws are often used in the very civil actions
where lost ESI caused harm to a party or parties. Thus, these laws are
important in assessing current federal civil procedure practices
regarding lost ESL
Because state spoliation laws for lost ESI now vary widely, the
interplay between these laws and federal procedural laws on lost ESI
will vary from district to district. Significant interstate variations include
such matters as who owes an information preservation duty; the
manner in which such a duty is breached; and the available remedy upon
breach.101 These variations cause special difficulties where there occur
multistate activities involving lost ESI impacting federal litigation. The
following sections generally review state substantive spoliation laws.me
These laws usually do not differentiate between spoliation of ESI and
non-ESL
Federal district courts can hear state spoliation claims because
there are no significant substantive federal spoliation laws.109 The
Committee Note accompanying the amendments to 2015 FRCP 37(e)
105. There may also be implied causes of action available to those criminally accused against
criminal prosecutors for information spoliation. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58
(1988) ("[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law."); State v.
Dejesus, 395 P.3d 111, 124 (Utah 2017) (reaffirming precedent on state constitutional due process
obligation of prosecutors to preserve evidence, which requires "a reasonable probability that the
lost evidence would have been exculpatory" and, if so found, a balancing of the culpability of the
State and the prejudice to the defendant in order to determine an appropriate remedy). Compare
Hibbits v. Sides, 34 P.3d 327, 330 (Alaska 2001) (recognizing intentional third-party spoliation as a
tort that could be pursued against a state trooper by motorcycle riders hurt by a pickup truck driver
who collided with them, where the trooper, the first on the scene, removed the driver for about two
hours after the collision because the trooper knew the driver was under the influence of marijuana),
with Ortega v. City of New York, 876 N.E.2d 1189, 1197 (N.Y. 2007) (finding no intentional
spoliation tort claim against city that sold a vehicle it was ordered to preserve so that future
claimants could use it in a later suit against the vehicle manufacturer).
106. Compare Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ill. 1995) (spoliation claim "under
existing negligence law"), with Heeter v. Hannah, 584 S.E.2d 560, 568 (W. Va. 2003) (Spoliation is a
"stand-alone tort").
107. Spoilation of Evidence Laws, MATHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., https://www.mwllaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/SPOLIATION-0F-EVIDENCE-CHART.pdf (last updated
June 30, 2021). While there are interstate differences, at least for corporations, there are a useful
set of guiding principles on organizational practices regarding record disposition. See Sedona Conf.,
Commentary on Defensible Disposition, 20 SEDONA. CONF. J. 179, 185-86 (2019).
108. Substantive state law claims for pre-suit spoliations are surveyed in more detail in Steven
Plitt & Jordan R. Plitt, A Jurisprudential Survey of the Tort of Spoliation of Evidence: Resolving ThirdParty Insurance Company Automobile Spoliation Claims, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 63, 63 (2017).
109. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001); Lombard v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 621, 627-28 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (finding no federal claim though
there was a violation of federal regulation on record retention).
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recognized that the new discovery sanction rule was not intended to
affect "the validity of an independent tort claim for spoliation if state law
applies in a case and authorizes the claim."11o There is no reason why a
state spoliation claim would not be available for information losses
outside of FRCP 37(e), that is, for losses of irreplaceable and nonrestorable ESI (as well as for non-ESI).
The following sections survey the varying forms of state spoliation
laws by utilizing the following Illinois Supreme Court analysis of pre-suit
information preservation duties in the Boyd case:
The general rule is that there is no duty to preserve evidence;
however, a duty to preserve evidence may arise through an
agreement, contract, a statute ... or another special circumstance.
Moreover, a defendant may voluntarily assume a duty by affirmative
conduct ... In any of the foregoing instances, a defendant owes a duty
of due care to preserve evidence if a reasonable person in the
defendant's position should have foreseen that the evidence was
material to a potential civil action.111

Other states recognize similar duties.112 Courts have extended these
pre-suit duties to both parties and nonparties in the future civil actions
impacted by lost ESI. Spoliation laws are only somewhat akin to the
duties under state civil procedure laws to have information available
when requested via formal discovery, including duties to preserve

110. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. There is room for some
substantive federal spoliation law, as when a government official intentionally destroys, or fails to
maintain or preserve, information important in a later civil action. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(providing for liability for those acting contrary to the federal Constitution or federal laws under
color of state law); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395-97 (1971) (finding liability for those acting unconstitutionally under color offederal law). On
Due Process claims involving information lost during criminal cases which may prompt federal civil
actions, see, for example, Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294-95 (3d Cir. 2018)
(stating a civil rights claim can be founded on "a 'conspiracy of silence among O[police] officers"'
regarding earlier excessive force).
111. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 271. Such pre-suit tort duties stand in stark contrast to more limited
evidence preservation duties recognized for state officials investigating crimes. See, e.g., Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) ("[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part
of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence [(semen samples)] does not constitute
a denial of due process of law."); State v. Dejesus, 395 P.3d 111, 119 (Utah 2017) (possible due
process denial under the Utah Constitution where there is shown "a reasonable probability that the
lost evidence [would be] exculpatory"; finding of denial requires an assessment of the degree of
prosecutorial culpability and the prejudice to the defendant).
112. See, e.g., Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P. 2d 11, 19 (Mont 1999) (citing Boyd, 652
N.E.2d at 269-70) (recognizing both a negligent and intentional tort claim for evidence spoliation);
Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 569-70 (W. Va. 2003) (citing Boyd 652 N.E.2d at 267, 270-71)
(adopting both a negligent and intentional tort claim for evidence spoliation by a non-party, but
only an intentional tort claim for evidence spoliation by an adverse party).
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before and during civil litigation.m As with the civil procedure discovery
duties, information preservation duties prompting spoliation claims can
also cover information preservation failures occurring during civil
litigation.
A. Special Circumstance and Voluntary Assumption Claims

Common law torts, as per Boyd, involving information spoliation114
can arise through a "special circumstance" or through a voluntary
assumption of a preservation duty "by affirmative conduct."m A special
circumstance may involve a fiduciary or otherwise special relationship
between parties where future civil litigation is reasonably anticipated. 11 6
Relevant relationships, where there may be no explicit agreements or
contracts on information preservation, can include insurer-insured,
attorney-client, and doctor-patient relationships. In these relationships,
information germane to a future case may not be preserved by an

113. See, e.g., Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motor Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. 1998) (explaining that
if a trial court could not "sanction a party for pre-suit destruction of evidence, a potential litigant
could circumvent discovery rules or escape liability simply by destroying the proof'). Remedies for
breaches of information preservation duties vary depending upon whether the duties arose under
tort law, civil procedure rules, or laws on discovery. For example, sanctions involving adverse jury
instructions may only be rendered post-suit and arise solely under civil procedure rules or
discovery laws. Pre-suit information preservation duties (keep records already made) differ from
pre-suit information maintenance duties (make records). See, e.g., Dittman v. U.P.M.C., 196 A.3d
1036, 1056 (Pa. 2018) (finding duties owed by employer to employees "to use reasonable care to
safeguard its employees' sensitive personal information O[when stored] on an internet-accessible
computer system'].
114. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270 ("[W]e today hold that an action for negligent spoliation can be
stated under existing negligence law.").
115. Boyd placed the evidence preservation duties "under existing negligence law." 652 N.E.2d
at 720. Alternatively, breaches may prompt applications of contract or special statutory duties. See,
e.g., infra notes 125, 131-32.
116. See, e.g., Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 879-81 (Ct. App.
2009) (insured sued insurer for promissory estoppel or voluntary assumption of duty when insurer
destroyed tire it examined that was needed by insured for its later product liability suit, where a
promise to safeguard was made by the insurer); Oliver, 993 P.2d at 20 (citing Johnson v. United
Servs. Auto Ass'n., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 239-41 (Ct. App. 1998)) (explaining that a duty to preserve
evidence may arise against a third-party spoliator "based upon a contract ... or some other special
circumstance/relationship"). Determinations of such special circumstances can be challenging. See,
e.g., Reynolds v. Lyman, 903 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding that a lawyer who represented
an owner of the LLC did not owe the owner a duty of care, so long as owner was not "a direct and
intended beneficiary" of the legal representation). Comparably, a "special relationship of trust and
confidence" in an otherwise "ordinary business" relationship can prompt a duty to disclose
"material information." BAS Broad., Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 110 N.E.3d 171, 175 (Ohio Ct. App.
2018).
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insurer or an attorney111 or a doctor11e resulting in harm to an insured
or a client or a patient in a later anticipated case. Additionally, a special
circumstance may arise when an expert, retained by a future litigant
without an explicit agreement on information preservation, loses
information passed to the expert for analysis. Yet for insurers, attorneys,
doctors, and experts, seemingly fewer spoliation tort claims will arise
where related claims are founded on implicit or explicit duties involving
contracts, like duties to defend, represent, treat, or test only in
reasonable fashions.
Affirmative conduct prompting a preservation duty may involve the
assumption of control over information that is reasonably foreseeable
as (quite) important to later or current litigation. Such a duty might be
extended to those who are not in a fiduciary or otherwise special
relationship with the litigant harmed by information spoliation.119
Consider, for example, an expert retained by a future or present
litigant to conduct device testing, who destroys or significantly alters the
device during testing so that the consulting litigant's adversary has no
opportunity to test independently or to observe the expert's testing.120
The now-current adversary involved in litigation with the party who
retained the expert may have an information spoliation claim against the
expert.
Consider also a future litigant's insurance adjuster who takes
possession of, and then negligently loses or intentionally destroys,
important information so that the litigant's future adversary has no
access later. The one-time future adversary, who is now in litigation with

117. On attorney spoliation and its deterrence, see, for example, Schaefer, supra note 43, at 63132 (suggesting new procedural rules on mandated disclosures ofattorney information preservation
efforts).
118. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Mem. Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 838 (D. Kan. 1992) (finding a
spoliation claim against treating physician founded on a regulatory duty to maintain medical
records pursuant to KAN.ADMIN. REGS.§ 100-24-1 (2021 )). But see Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Serv. Dist. No. 1, 970 So. 2d 1100, 1106 (La. Ct App. 2007) (requiring evidence of deliberate
spoliation to support a tort claim founded on a breach of the statutory duty to preserve medical
records).
119. See, e.g., Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349, 352, 355 (Ind. 2005) (noting such
an extension may be made even though there is no substantive law preservation duty owed by one
in a fiduciary or otherwise special relationship). In one case, there was no such duty recognized for
a lawyer to the opposing party, at least where the lawyer concealed the evidence but did not destroy
it Elliot-Thomas v. Smith, 110 N.E.3d 1231, 1234-35 (Ohio 2018).
120. Once civil litigation is pending, there are some written laws on the need to notify-and
perhaps include-an adversary when expert testing of relevant evidence is planned. See, e.g., TENN.
R. CIV. P. 34 A.01.
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the litigant, may have an information spoliation claim against the
litigant's insurer.121
Finally, consider a governmental officer or agency that takes
information and then loses it to the detriment of another involved in
later or current litigation with the information supplier. A torts claim
statute12 2 or comparable law12 3 might place the government officer or
agency in a position similar to that of a private party who loses
information.124
Where a common law duty to preserve is established, and does not
depend upon an agreement/contract! whether through a "special
circumstance" or "affirmative conduct," an information spoliation tort
might require proof of culpability going beyond mere negligence.m The
requisite degree of proof can depend on whether the duty was owed by
121. Compare, e.g., Dardeen v. Kuehling, 821 N.E. 2d 227, 233 (Ill. 2004) (holding that an insurer,
who told its insured homeowner she could remove bricks in an allegedly hazardous sidewalk had
no liability to pedestrian who had earlier fallen), with Jones v. O'Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., lnc.,
871 N.E.2d 98, 99, 108 (Ill. App. Ct 2007) (discussing the potentially liability of driver's insurer to
the insured's joint tortfeasor for failure to preserve wheels from driver's car after driver's insurer
settled with a tort victim who later sued the insured's joint tortfeasor; driver's insurer had
voluntarily undertaken control of wheels for its own benefit and should have anticipated possibility
of future litigation), and Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1995) (finding
employer's workers' compensation insurer owed duty to preserve space heater that it took
possession of and that was involved in a workplace accident where employee pursued product
liability claim against manufacturer of heater).
122. But see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (stating the Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply to claims
of "malicious prosecution, abuse of process ... deceit, or interference with contract rights.'}
123. See, e.g., Hazen v. Mun. of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986) (holding that one
who is arrested has a common law claim in tort for intentional interference with prospective civil
action caused by the spoliation of evidence, here the alteration of an arrest tape); Nichols v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 6 P. 3d 300, 303-04 (Alaska 2000) (finding no first party or third-party
evidence spoliation claim founded on negligence, where first party alleged spoliators were defined
as the parties to the original action). A statute, court rule, or inherent power precedent on civil
procedure sanctions often does not distinguish between private and public officer conduct, or
between private and public entity conduct. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 11, 16(f), 37 (containing no
reference to any distinction between private entities and public entities in varying sanction
settings).
124. An attorney's spoliation of information harmful to a non-client might be shielded from
liability under an attorney immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Haynes & Boone, LLP v. NFTD, LLC, No. 200066, 2021 WL 2021453, at*l (Tex. May 21, 2021).
125. See, e.g., Willis v. Cost Plus, Inc., No. 16-639, 2018 WL 1319194, at *3-4 (W.D. La. Mar. 12,
2018) (noting that while the Louisiana Supreme Court has held there is no cause of action for
negligent spoliation, lower Louisiana state courts have recognized a Louisiana claim for spoliation
based on intentional conduct). But see Richardson v. Sara Lee Corp., 847 So. 2d 821, 822 (Miss.
2003) (finding no negligence or intentional tort claim for spoliation of evidence). Similarly, a civil
procedure law sanction for pre-suit evidence spoliation may only be available if intentional
misconduct is shown. See, e.g., Tatham v. Bridgestone Am. Holding, Inc., 4 73 S.W. 3d 734, 746 (Tenn.
2015) (altering earlier laws declaring that "intentional misconduct is not a prerequisite" for
spoliation sanctions any longer); Mont. St. Univ. Bozeman v. Mont First Jud. Dist. Ct, 426 P.3d 541,
553-54 (Mont. 2018) (holding that an intentional evidence spoliation prompts a rebuttable
presumption that evidence was materially unfavorable to spoliating party, while negligent
spoliation does not).
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one who is or could have been an adverse party in the civil litigation
wherein the lost information would have been employed.126
Additionally, even where a party establishes the necessary degree
of culpability, liability may vary depending upon whether the opposing
party intentionally destroyed the information or only intentionally
concealed it.127 Lastly, liability may vary for those personally responsible
for spoliating evidence and those responsible for aiding and abetting
spoliation by others.12e
B. Agreement/Contract Claims

Agreement/contract duties operate differently than tort duties do
in spoliation cases. The intentions of the agreeing/contracting parties,
rather than the hypothesized actions of reasonable persons or the
intentional acts of people, are key. Seemingly, there can be instances
where there are both tort and agreement or contract claims involving
the same spoliated information.129
126. See, e.g., Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 573-74 [W. Va. 2003) (finding no negligent
spoliation claim against adverse party, but finding a negligent spoliation claim against a third party
who could not otherwise be an adverse party, because only the former can be sanctioned under
discovery laws; and finding intentional evidence spoliation is a stand-alone tort available against
both an adverse party and a third party). Compare, e.g., Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11,
20 (Mont. 1999) (recognizing possible negligent spoliation of evidence tort by employee against
employer who could not otherwise be sued due to Workers' Compensation Act for employment
injuries, yet equipment manufacturer could be sued; request to preserve may have been made and,
if it was, it did not need to offer to pay reasonable costs of preservation); MetLife Auto & Home v.
Joe Basil Chevrolet, Inc., 807 N.E.2d 865, 868 (N.Y. 2004) (explaining that homeowner might be able
to sue car owner's insurer for spoliation, but seemingly would need to submit a written (not just
oral) preservation request and to volunteer to cover the costs associated with preservation);
Nichols, 6 P.3d at 305 (involving an intentional spoliation claim by neighbor against tortfeasor's
insurer and against homeowner), with Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 427-28
(Mass. 2002) (finding no negligent evidence spoliation tort by tenant against a landlord's insurer or
against an expert retained by that insurer).
127. See, e.g., Elliot-Thomas v. Smith, 110 N.E.3d 1231, 1235 (Ohio 2018) (concluding that tort
of intentional evidence spoliation extends to destroyed, but not concealed, evidence).
128. On aiding and abetting responsibilities, see, for example, Meridian Med. Sys., LLC v. Epix
Therapeutics, Inc., 250 A.3d 122, 128 (Me. 2021). On the liability of government officials for the
unconstitutional actions of their subordinates due to supervisory/failure to intervene conduct, see,
for example, McCoy v. Vallejo, No. 2:19-cv-01191, 2021 WL 2661757, at 0 3-4 (E.D. Cal. June 29,
2021) and Rice v. City ofRoy, No. 20-5223, 2021 WL 2823227, 0 6, 8 [W.D. Wash. July 7, 2021).
129. For example, a contractual duty of an insurer to preserve evidence reasonably necessary in
an insured's later defense of an action seeking damages beyond policy limits may arise in settings
where there are also independent preservation duties in tort owed by the insurer to the insured, or
to one harmed by the insured. See, e.g., Silhan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1307-11
(N.D. Fla. 2002) (discussing circumstances allowing recognitions of tort or contract claims by
insureds against insurers due to spoliation of evidence by insurers that is needed in insureds'
products-liability claims against third parties). Consider an employee's duty, as a condition of
employment, to provide confidential information to an employer. See, e.g., Dittman v. UPMC, 196
A.3d 1036, 105 7 (Saylor, C.J, concurring and dissenting) (finding information maintenance claims
against employers can sound in both tort and contract, presenting a hybrid scenario).
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The Boyd court did not elaborate on what, if any, differences arise
between spoliation claims founded on agreements and on contracts;
perhaps the two are synonymous. Or perhaps only the spoliation claim
founded on an agreement encompasses an explicit pact on information
preservation that is made in anticipation of a possible lawsuit or during
a lawsuit. Such pacts would be similar to pacts on matters like forum
selection, choice of law, and jury trial waiver.
A spoliation claim founded on contract may also encompass a pact
on information preservation which, at the time made, was unrelated to
any anticipated or pending litigation, but rather was related to a desire
to have maintained or to access certain current or future materials, like
tax preparation, medical, educational, or test records. Substantive
contract laws may likely guide such pacts (uninfluenced by civil
procedure laws) though preservation failures could prompt later civil
litigation sanctions or spoliation claims.
Agreements, as opposed to contracts, under Boyd might encompass
failures involving unilateral promises of information preservation on
which there was recognized detrimental reliance prompting harm for
those who reasonably relied. These agreements are akin to, but differ
from, voluntary assumptions of preservation duties through nonpromissory "affirmative conduct." Agreements might also encompass
bilateral promises outside of technical contract requirements like
statutes of fraud.
Be they agreements or contracts, third parties may have spoliation
claims arising from the contracts or agreements between others. As with
spoliation torts involving a special circumstance or voluntary
assumption, here the third parties may have no avenues of redress
through discovery sanctions.13o These third parties may or may not need
to be intended beneficiaries of the promises.
C. Statutory and Regulatory Claims
Beyond tort and agreement/contract claims, under Boyd, spoliation
claims may arise from violations of written laws on information
maintenance, preservation, or production. Statutes might expressly
130. Be they agreements or contracts, third parties may have spoliation claims. See, e.g., Jallali v.
Nat'I. Bd. of Osteopathic Med. Exam'r, Inc. 518 F. App'x. 863, 865-67 (11th Cir. 2013) (involving a
claim by state exam test taker against private testing service and state that testing service failed to
maintain test taker's exam sheets and other test materials in contravention of five-year retention
policy spelled out in services contract with state). The spoliation claim in]al/ali would not prompt
discovery sanctions against the testing service if there was no procedural common law duty to
preserve.
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recognize a civil claim for harm resulting from certain information
losses. Further, statutory duties, as well as perhaps regulatory duties
tied to enabling statutes,131 might support implied causes of action.132
Without express legislative intent, spoliation claims may be implied
from the written prohibitions where:
(1) the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute
was enacted; (2) the plaintiffs injury is one the statute was designed
to prevent; (3) a private right of action is consistent with the
underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private right of
action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of
the statute.133

The guiding principles on implied causes of action arising from
regulatory duties, however, should differ from the principles applied to
causes arising solely from statutes.134
A medical records retention statute in Illinois illustrates a written
law from which an information spoliation claim might be implied. There,
a hospital must retain an x-ray for at least five years, and for up to twelve
years if notified within five years of any pending litigation wherein the
x-ray is "possible evidence." 135 Here, information preservation duties
131. Sometimes enabling statutes expressly recognize claims for regulatory violations, making
analyses of the precedents on implied claims unnecessary. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (allowing
suit for injury resulting from "violation of a consumer product safety rule ... issued by the
Commission").
132. Dean Spencer has suggested statutory /regulatory duties on information preservation
should prompt federal civil procedure law duties on information production in discovery, urging an
amendment to FRCP 37(e). Spencer, supra note 85, at 2023 (advocating for sanctions on failure to
produce information that was "subject to a statutory or regulatory duty to preserve").
133. Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (Ill. 2004). The Supreme Court established
comparable guidelines for implied federal claims in Cort v.Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), as construed
in Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 689-709 (1979). Other state courts have employed these
guidelines. See, e.g., Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Iowa 1982) ('We believe
the basic analytical approach of the Supreme Court is correct."); Yedidag v. Roswell Clinic Corp., 346
P.3d 1136, 1146 (N.M. 2015) (decision "influenced by three of four factors set out in Cort"); Bennett
v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Wash. 1990) ("borrowing from the test" in Cort). For differing views
on applying these (and other) guidelines on implied causes of action, see the varying opinions in
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2002).
134. Only elected legislators generally have authority to recognize substantive civil claims. Any
precedents implying causes of action from regulations underlying statutes necessarily would entail
considerations of the language and legislative intentions behind the enabling statutes. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292-93 (2001) (resulting in a five-justice opinion rejecting to
imply a private cause of action for violations of a Department of Transportation regulation but
indicating there may be a different outcome where the enabling statute contained language on
creating private rights rather than on government enforcement).
135. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1 (2021); see also LA. STAT.ANN.§ 40:2144 (FJ(l) (2021) ("Hospital
records shall be retained by hospitals ... for a minimum period often years from the date a patient
is discharged."); Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 970 So. 2d 1100, 1106 (La. Ct
App. 2007) (need deliberate spoliation to support tort claim); KAN. ADMIN. REGS.§ 100-24-1 (2021)
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exist both pre-suit and post-suit. Such duties are only sometimes
explicitly tied to civil litigation. Seemingly, the Boyd precedent could
support a substantive law claim under this statute on behalf of one
harmed in civil litigation by a hospital's pre-suit failure to retain covered
records, as well as a comparable failure post-suit by a hospital.
Similar to the Illinois statute, the California Government Code
contains a provision on employment record retention. It says:
It shall be an unlawful practice for employers, labor organizations,
and employment agencies ... to fail to maintain and preserve any and
all applications, personnel, membership; or employment referral
records and files for a minimum period of four years after the records
and files are initially created or received, or for employers to fail to
retain personnel files of applicants or terminated employees for a
minimum period of four years after the date of the employment
action taken.... Upon notice that a verified complaint against it has
been filed ... any such employer, labor organization, or employment
agency shall maintain and preserve any and all records and files until
the complaint is fully and finally disposed of and all appeals or related
proceedings terminated....136
Further, a federal regulation on public contract recordkeeping says,
"any personnel or employment record made or kept by the contractor
shall be preserved by the contractor for a period of two years."m It goes
on:
[w]here the contractor has received notice that a complaint of
discrimination has been filed ... the contractor shall preserve all
personnel records relevant ... until final disposition .... The term
personnel records ... would include, for example, personnel or
employment records relating to the aggrieved person and to all other

(recognizing licensee's duty to "maintain an adequate record for each patient for whom the licensee
performs a professional service"), employed in Foster v. Lawrence Mem. Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831,
838 (D. Kan. 1992) (involving a spoliation claim against doctor for breach of regulatory duty).
136. Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 278 § 12946 (S.B. 807) (West 2021) (existing within a title on state
government addressing prohibited discrimination). This Code provision, unlike the Illinois statute,
does not have the preservation duty set to expire at a fixed date. The lengthier duty to preserve in
California, unlike in Illinois, only falls, however, to one who is a defendant in a civil case. Another
comparable California statute is Cal. Bus. & Prorl Code § 5097 ( existing within a statutory division
on professions and vocations, the chapter on accountants addresses the maintenance of "audit
documentation").
137. 41 C.F.R § 60-300.80(a) (2021); see also 7 C.F.R. § 81.13 (2021) (requiring accurate records
be maintained and preserved regarding prune/plum tree removals).
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employees holding positions similar to that held or sought by the
aggrieved person.13B

There may be some statutory information preservation duties tied
to criminal cases that support civil spoliation claims. In South Carolina,
a statute addresses the duty of a "custodian" to "preserve all physical
evidence and biological material related to the conviction or
adjudication of a person" for certain offenses.139 While this statute
expressly operates only after a conviction or an adjudication,140 it can be
reasonably construed to cover pre-suit information preservation,
especially for exculpatory information.Ht Thus, the statute may prompt
a spoliation claim on behalf of a person who is exonerated where the
exoneration was (long) delayed by a statutory violation.142
IV. NEW APPROACHES TO ES/ LOSSES IN FEDERAL CIVIL ACTIONS
As demonstrated, there are significant procedural and substantive
law consequences for both parties and nonparties who fail to maintain,
preserve, or produce discoverable ESI, where failures may occur before
or during civil litigation. Often, failures occur even though there were
ESI preservation demands. Are there better ways to address such ESI
losses? If so, what new approaches are most appropriate and what
issues arise when considering reforms?
The following sections discuss several important questions when
considering new approaches to lost discoverable ESI in federal civil
actions. The questions include:
• Should the FRCP maintain varied responses to different ESI
losses?
• Should the FRCP maintain varied responses to ESI and nonESI losses?
138. 41 C.F.R. § 60-300.80(a) (including application forms and test papers in recordkeeping
requirements).
139. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 17-28-320(a)(l), (10), (14), (19) (2021) (offenses include murder and
arson in the first degree resulting in death) .
140. An adjudication without a conviction of certain covered offenses, like a finding that a person
is a "sexually violent predator," can be made, for example, in an involuntary civil commitment
proceeding. s.c. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100 (2021).
141. See, e.g., Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320, 324 (S.C. 1999) (recognizing prosecutorial
preservation and production duties, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 (1963), for
exculpatory Information); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2021)
(identifying prosecutor's duty to disclose to defense all evidence or information tending to negate
the guilt of the accused).
142. Such a civil suit for harm caused by evidence loss may require proofof willful and malicious
conduct leading to information loss, as this mens rea is needed for a criminal misdemeanor
conviction. s.c. CODE ANN.§ 17-28-350.
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What federal interests impact enforcement of state
spoliation claims?
Are new laws needed on pre-suit ESI preservation and
protective orders?

A. Maintain Varied Judicial Responses to Different ESI Losses?

As noted, FRCP 37(e) speaks to judicial measures addressing
failures to preserve discoverable ESI "in the anticipation or conduct of
litigation," but only if the lost ESI "cannot be restored or replaced
through additional discovery." Assuming FRCP 37(e) excludes
restorable or replaceable ESI, regardless of cost/benefit analysis, other
FRCP provisions contemplate a party's failure to preserve certain
discoverable ESL Two such examples are FRCP 37(a)(3), which concerns
a party's failure to make a FRCP 26(a) disclosure, and FRCP 34, which
concerns a party's failure to produce requested materials.
Party failures to preserve FRCP 37(e) ESI, whatever it embodies,
seemingly can only prompt "measures no greater than necessary to cure
the prejudice,"143 as FRCP 37 is the only rule that can address these
failures.14 4 Possible party failures to preserve other ESI (again assuming
some ESI lies outside of Rule 37(e)), and all non party failures to preserve
ESI can prompt noncurative measures, like contempt,145 under rules
outside of FRCP 3 7 (e).
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (1) ( containing measures addressing a party's failure "to take reasonable
steps" to preserve non-restorable and irreplaceable ESI). Under FRCP 37(e)(2), where ESI
preservation failures involved a party acting "with the intent to deprive another party of the
information's use in the litigation," there are explicitly recognized curative measures in place, such
as evidentiary presumptions, adverse inference jury instructions, involuntary dismissals, and
default judgments. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e)(2).
144. The Comment to the 2006 Rule 37(e) recognized its provisions on sanctions did not "affect
other sources of authority to impose sanctions or rules of professional responsibility." 2006 FED. R.
C1v. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendment. The Comment to the 2015 FRCP
37(e) recognized it "forecloses reliance on inherent authority or state law to determine when
certain measures should be used," upon observing that federal circuits had "established
significantly different standards for imposing sanctions or curative measures on parties who fail to
preserve" ESI. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to the 2015 amendment
145. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 37(d)(3) (imposing sanctions against a party for failing to serve an
adequate interrogatory answer or to respond adequately to a request for inspection, including an
award of "reasonable expenses" against a "party failing to act, the attorney advising that party, or
both"). For a nonparty who fails to produce ESI pursuant to a deposition order in violation of the
procedural common-law preservation duty, if there is indeed such a duty, that nonparty can be
subject to contempt. FED R. CIV. P. 45(g); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(l)(A)(iii) (providing that a
subpoena can compel a person to "produce ... electronically stored information"). On non-party
preservation duties, consider the facts in Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 592 (2001)
(finding it "readily apparent" that the plaintiff, "his attorneys, and his expert witnesses" anticipated
litigation, though the failure to preserve a vehicle involved in an accident was only found as to the
plaintiff). See also Joseph A. Nicholson, Plus Ultra: Third-Party Preservation in a Cloud Computing
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The original Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Committee)
circulated what became the 2015 (and current) FRCP 37(e) for public
comment in August 2013. 14 6 It contained no distinction involving
restorable/replaceable ESI, and no distinction between ESI and non-ESI,
as it spoke to sanctions for failures to "preserve discoverable
information."147 The Committee altered the 2013 proposal in April 2014
in response to 2,345 written comments, together with three public
hearings with more than 120 witnesses speaking.He The invitation for
comment by the Committee asked, inter alia, "whether the rule should
be limited to ESl." 149 The Committee said that the limitation in the 2015
FRCP 37(e) to (certain) ESI closed the "door to avoiding the limits"
otherwise imposed on "sanctions,"1so while noting both the "practical
distinctions between ESI and other kinds of evidence" and the
continuing "explosion" and acceleration ofEs1.1s1 FRCP 37(e) seemingly
excluded the non-curative sanction of contempt and other non-curative
sanctions in part because ESI preservation failures do not trigger
violations of court orders (or rules).1s2 Yet contempt proceedings need
not involve alleged violations of court orders (or written rules ).153
While these curative measures/sanction guidelines may differ in
language, if not in operation, the federal "common-law duty," that is the
"common-law obligation," of potential litigants to preserve relevant
information encompasses materials in and outside ofFRCP 37(e).1S4
The varied FRCP authorities for addressing lost, non-restorable,
and irreplaceable ESI and for lost, restorable, and replaceable ESI may
cause no true operational differences if these authorities generally lead
Paradigm, 8 HASTINGS Bus. L .J. 191, 217-18 (2012) (after noting ES! custodians "are frequently
nonparties for whom the duty to preserve as currently conceived does not effectively attach," urging
lawmakers to "consider whether the business of storing data should include an obligation to
preserve evidence for litigation").
146. Thought Leadership Team, FRCP Amendments: The Long and Winding Road, KL DISCOVERY
(Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.kldiscovery.com/blog/frcp-amendments-Iong-winding-road (The
"active public comment period ... ran from August 2013 through February 2014.").
147. MAY2014AGENDABOOK, supra note 88, at 324.
148. Id. at 306.
149. Id. at 307.
150. Id. at 311.
151. Id. at 309, 311.
152. Id. at 309.
153. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401(1), (2) (providing that criminal contempt can involve "misbehavior
of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice" or
"misbehavior" of any officer of a court in an "official" transaction); Hayes v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc.,
789 F. App'x. 701, 702-03 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding contempt when legal secretary for defendant's
attorney gestured to a testifying witness not to answer a certain question). See generally Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379-80 (1994) (defining ancillary jurisdiction to
include orders that "enable a court to function successfully").
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
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to the same results when any nonprivileged ESI is lost. But the results
will sometimes differ as the relevant guidelines vary. Under FRCP 37(e),
courts must only levy these measures where there is "prejudice" to
another party, and even then, only when it is "necessary to cure the
prejudice." 155 Even when there was an "intent to deprive another party
of the information's use in the litigation," measures must be curative in
that they address fair resolutions of pending claims. This ensures there
are no measures promoting deterrence and/or punishment as through
fines or disciplinary referrals.156
Outside of FRCP 37(e), discovery sanction hearings will often
address how a sanctioned party should restore or replace lost ESJ.157
Here, one issue is who should pay to recover lost ESI when the court
orders a party to recover it. Another issue is when recoverable ESI will
not be ordered to be recovered due to cost.ise For lost ESI that falls
outside of the purview of Rule 37(e), assuming Rule 37(e) only
encompasses ESI that can never be restored or replaced, there are
express recognitions of non-curative measures, including contempt
proceedings. 159 The question arises whether the distinction between
some and other lost ESI by a party (again, assuming FRCP 37(e) only
encompasses ESI unavailable at any cost) on curative/non-curative
measures is sound, because only intentional (and perhaps other)
destructions ofESI which is recoverable and restorable can prompt noncurative measures. Of course, the availability of noncurative measures
against non-parties who lose ESI makes sense, as they are not subject to
jury instructions.
Given these differences in addressing some and other ESI losses,
why was FRCP 37(e) amended in 2015 to reflectthese differences? The
Note for the 2015 FRCP 37(e) provides little help. The Note does
155. FED. R. CIV. P.37(e)(1).
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2). Whether litigation expense recoveries are curative under FRCP
37(e) is unclear. See Letter from District Judge lain D. Johnston to District Judge Robert Dow, Jr.,
(Feb. 8, 2021), suggesting that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules consider amendments to
FRCP 37(e) that expressly authorize the sanction of"the payment ofreasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees," since authorization under the current rule is unclear, although authority is
recognized by Thomas Y. Allman in Dealing with Prejudice: How Amended Rule 37(e) Has Refocused
ES/ Spoliation Measures, 26 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 64-66 (2020). The letter appears in the Rule
Suggestions section on federal judicial rulemaking that appears on the website of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
157. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 37(a)(3)(iv) (compelling the restoration or replacement ofESI that
was not produced as it was then lost).
158. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (requiring every discovery request be reasonable, and not
prompt undue expense, considering case needs, earlier discovery, and the importance of the issues
at stake); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(8) (not requiring ESI discovery where sources are "not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost").
159. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(vii), (d)(3).
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recognize that certain lost ESI that can be restored or replaced need not
be subject to discovery through a restoration or replacement court order
when such discovery is not "proportional to the apparent importance of
the lost information to the claims or defenses in the litigation."160
Perhaps lost ESI that will not be restored/replaced by court order due
to cost/proportionality, though it could be, falls within FRCP 37(e). Yet
Rule 37(e) still distinguishes as it only speaks to a party's failure; a nonparty can have a procedural common law duty to preserve, perhaps
inferred or derived from a statutory duty, as with medical employment
recordkeeping.161
The aforenoted 2018 Arizona civil procedure rule on pre-suit
judicial dispute resolutions involving information preservation duties
speaks to all ESI, making no distinction between ESI forms as it exists in
FRCP 37(e).162
Whatever the earlier rationales for distinguishing between forms of
ESI, federal rule makers should now further inquire into any distinctions
by seeking (e.g., through the Federal Judicial Center) empirical data on
how the federal district courts now approach all ESI losses and how
FRCP 37(e) measures for some lost ESI differ, if at all, from FRCP 37(a)
sanctions for other lost ESL Here, explorations of state practices which

160. FED. R CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to the 2015 amendment ("[S)ubstantial
measures should not be employed to restore or replace information that is marginally relevant or
duplicative.").
161. In promulgating 2006 FRCP 37(f), in considering 2013 Proposed FRCP 37(e), and in
promulgating 2015 FRCP 37(1), federal judicial rule makers rejected suggestions to embody a
procedural law discovery preservation duty within the FRCP, opting to continue with a common
law approach. See MAY 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note 88, at 319. ("Rule 37(e) is based on this
common-law duty; it does not attempt to create a new duty to preserve."). This approach prompts
judicial policymaking on procedural information preservation duties outside, but complimentary
of, the FRCP. See lain D. Johnston, Federal Courts' Authority to Impose Sanctions for Prelitigation or
Pre-Order Spoliation ofEvidence, 156 F.R.D. 313 (1994) (an early survey of federal court precedents
on procedural law information preservation duties which can prompt sanctions/curative measures
when the duties are breached); Robert Keeling. Sometimes, Old Rules Know Best: Returning to
Common Law Conceptions ofthe Duty to Preserve in the Digital Information Age, 67 CATH. UNIV. L. REV.
67, 102 (2018) (survey of more recent cases; concluding laws should return to a time when
preservation duty arises with actual filing of a lawsuit, or, at most, "when litigation is imminent'1,
Such policymaking can also embody judicial precedents that are tethered to a statute/regulation on
information maintenance/preservation/production. See, e.g., MAY 2014 AGENDA BooK, supra note
BB, at 319 (providing that rulings on procedural common law preservation duty should take
account of, but need not mimic, "statutes, administrative regulations, an order in another case, or a
party's own information-retention protocols"). As well, a statute/regulation accounted for in
common law preservation rulings can also prompt substantive law policymaking. as by implied
causes of action on behalf of intended beneficiaries that run against those subject to the
statutory/regulatory duty. See, e.g., supra notes 131-33 (including statues on maintaining
employment and medical records).
162. ARIZ R. CIV. P. 45.2(a).
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follow the 2015 FRCP 37(e) and which follow the 2006 FRCP 37(e) could
be useful.
B. Maintain Varied Judicial Responses to ESI and non-ESI Losses?

In looking anew at how measures are assessed for lost, nonrestorable, and irreplaceable ESI and for lost, restorable, and
replaceable ES!, federal rule makers should also explore again whether
the varied responses to ESI and non-ES! are still warranted. A simple
question could be asked: what consequences may likely follow-given
empirical research-if a failure to preserve the very same information,
albeit in different forms, is found, as with lost ESI and a lost document
containing what was in that lost ESI?
If the failure to preserve the information described above in nonrestorable and irreplaceable ESI involved an "intent to deprive another
party of the information's use in ... litigation."1 63 FRCP 37(e)(2)
allows-but does not require the employment of-the measures of an
adverse presumption, an adverse jury instruction, or an involuntary
dismissal or default judgment. When a similar intent lies behind a
document loss resulting in a discovery failure,164 the FRCP authorize
discretionary orders that may include directing that "designated facts be
taken as established," not unlike an adverse presumption order;16s that
the jury be informed of the preservation failure, not unlike an adverse
jury instruction;166 and that a claim be dismissed or a default judgment
be rendered, not unlike the FRCP 37(e) dismissal or default order.1 67 But
outside of FRCP 37(e), with perhaps some ES! (restorable/replaceable
ES! and/or nonparty ESI) and non-ESI, FRCP 37 also authorizes
contempt proceedings (i.e., noncurative measure).16e
As to why the 2015 FRCP 37(e) established differences between
sanctions for some lost ES! and for other lost ESI and lost non-ESJ,169 the
163. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e)(2).
164. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (failure to obey a court order to permit discovery); FED. R. C1v. P.
37(c) (failure in mandatory disclosure or supplemental discovery).
165. FED.R. C!v. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i) (court order disobeyed); FED. R. C1v. P. 37(c)(1)(C) (referencing
FRCP 37(b)(2)(A)(i) for disclosure/supplemental discovery failures).
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(B) (for discovery/supplemental discovery failures).
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v), (vi) (court order disobeyed); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(C)
(referencing Rule 37(b)(2)(A) for disclosure/supplemental discovery failure).
168. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 37(b)(2)(vii) (contempt). Compare FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) (sanctions
must seek "to cure the prejudice'1, with FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (b)(2) (sanction to be embodied in "just
orders," which "may" include curative measures).
169. The 2015 Rule 37(e) continued to recognize that for all information (i.e., ESI and non-ESI)
there is a comparable common-law preservation duty or obligation "in the anticipation or conduct
oflitigation." FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
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Committee Note simply expresses concerns with "the serious problems
resulting from the continued exponential growth in the volume of such
information." 110 It then observed:
Federal circuits have established significantly different standards for
imposing sanctions or curative measures on parties who fail to
preserve electronically stored information. These developments
have caused litigants to expend excessive effort and money on
preservation in order to avoid the risk of severe sanctions if a court
finds they did not do enough.171

In 2006 when FRCP 37(e) still distinguished the sanctions for ESI
and non-ESI losses, the Committee Note indicated a concern about
sanctioning one who lost information through the "routine operation" of
a computer system without "specific direction or awareness, a feature
with no direct counterpart in hard-copy documents."172
Did the 2015 FRCP 37(e) rule makers implicitly find no
"exponential growth" in documents? 173 And did they find more uniform
sanctions followed document losses? Finally, did they find no "excessive
effort and money" accompanied document preservation?174
The aforenoted 2018 Arizona civil rule on pre-suit disputes over
information preservation duties also distinguishes between ESI and
non-ESI as it only applies to disagreements over Es1.11s Unlike FRCP
3 7 (e), the 2018 Arizona rule does not distinguish between varying forms
of ESl.176 Its legislative history justified the ESI and non-ESI distinction
by focusing on "the explosion in ESI" which "has created a corresponding
explosion in discovery costs for parties and nonparties alike," including
"demands that parties and nonparties preserve massive amounts of
information."177 The Arizona rule applies to a pre-suit dispute raised by
The 2015 FRCP 37(e), but not the 2006 FRCP 37(e), distinguished between lost, irreplaceable, and
non-restorable ESI and other lost ESI. The 2015 FRCP 37(e) Advisory Committee Notes do not offer
a justification for this difference. They do observe that the 2015 rule "replaces the 2006 rule," and
applies only to ESI that is "also the focus of the 2006 rule." FED.R. C1v. P. 37(e) advisory committee's
note to 2015 amendment.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
171. Id.
172. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
173. Recall that in 2013, federal civil procedure rule makers did consider "a uniform set of
guidelines for ... all discoverable information." 2013 FRCP 37(E) PROPOSAL, supra note 75, at 44.
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
175. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2.
176. ARIZ.R.CIV.P.45.2(a).
177. See, e.g., A Call to Reform, COMM. ON CIV. JUST. REFORM'S REPORT TO THE ARIZ. JUD. COUNCIL (Oct.
2016), at 14; see also id. at 15 (The new rule allows a petition for a court order declaring a
"preservation demand" is "unreasonably burdensome" or declaring "the demanding party must pay
for some or all of what it has demanded.").

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3891779

366

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. 51

a nonparty in receipt of a "preservation request" where the nonparty
may or may not be a party if a later related civil action is presented. t 7B
C. Limits on State Spoliation Claims for ESI Losses?
As noted, FRCP 37(e) "does not affect the validity of an independent
tort claim for spoliation if state law applies in a case and authorizes the
claim." 179 There is little reason to think that FRCP 37(e) does affect
substantive state spoliation claims for certain ESI losses outside of tort.
Further, nothing suggests that the remainder of FRCP 3 7 affects
substantive state spoliation claims (in and outside oftort) for ESI losses
outside of Rule 37(e) (and for non-ESI losses). Perhaps there is little
reason to think that federal procedural laws outside of FRCP 3 7 affect
substantive state spoliation claims for lost information (both ESI and
non-ES!) relevant to civil cases, as with federal procedural common law
precedents on the duty to preserve information in anticipation of
foreseeable civil litigation.
As recognized in the 2015 FRCP 37(e) Advisory Committee Notes,
there is a federal procedural "common-law duty" to preserve Rule 37(e)
ESI (and other information) that federal procedural law rulings can
address when a party breaches its preservation duties, including presuit breaches. Before 2006, between 2006 and 2015, and since 2015,
varying types of state substantive spoliation claims, involving varying
forms of information lost at varying times, have been presented in
related federal civil actions.100 The Committee Note to the 2015 FRCP
37(e) did observe that state substantive spoliation laws, with
"independent preservation requirements," would not necessarily

178. ARIZ.R. C!V. P. 45.2 (defining a nonpartyas "a person who receives a preservation request ...
and is not a party to a pending action in which the request is made"); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(e)
(providing that a nonparty may seek determination on "the existence or scope of any duty to
preserve" ESI where there is "no pending action").
179. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
180. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of Albuquerque, No. 97-1324, 1998 WL 36030893, at *3 (D.N.M. Mar.
24, 1998) (involving evidence tampering and spoliation by police at the scene of an alleged
homicide); Doe v. Village of Lombard, No. 06C7048, 2007WL 2788838, at*l (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2007)
(involving failure by police officer and village to preserve fingernail clippings taken from suspected
criminal); Jallali v. Nat'I. Bd. of Osteopathic Med. Exam'r, Inc., 518 F. App'x 863, 867 (11th Cir. 2013)
(involving a third-party failure to preserve exam sheets and other test materials); Teague v.
Armstead, 82 F. Supp. 3d 817, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (involving negligent failure to preserve video
recordings); Jou v. Adalian, No. 15-00155, 2018 WL 1955415, at *5-7 (D. Haw. Apr. 25, 2018)
(regarding notes between two people, and limited partnership records); Willis v. Cost Plus, Inc., No.
16-639, 2018 WL 1319194, at *1 (W.D. La. Mar. 12, 2018) (involving failure to preserve a store's
surveillance footage).
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prompt federal procedural common law information preservation
duties. 181
In contemplating new and continued approaches to state
substantive spoliation claims for ESI losses in related federal cases,
certain limitations must be recognized. Explorations of some of these
limits follow.
1. Pre-suit and Post-suit ES/ Losses

The limits on spoliation claims in federal courts should distinguish
between pre-suit and post~suit ESI losses. The pre-suit setting requires
such a distinction because there are far fewer reasonable anticipations
of the future need of ESI in federal civil litigation. Of course, there are
times when future parties and witnesses anticipate later federal cases,
as when ESI is relevant to foreseeable claims, exemplified by patent
disputes, that can only be presented in federal district courts. Other than
purely jurisdictional disputes, foreseeable federal cases are apparent
from pre-suit information preservation demand letters.
Even when pre-suit ESI maintenance and preservation are not
reasonably foreseeable by the actual or potential ESI holder as relevant
to later federal litigation, spoliation claims should sometimes still be
proper in a later, related federal civil action. Jurisdiction and venue
issues aside, presentation is more appropriate where the spoliation
claims do not depend upon reasonably foreseeable litigation. Recall the
illustrative contractual and statutory information preservation
duties. 102 Then, consider the somewhat analogous scenario where it
would sometimes serve both public and private interests to have a
disputed legal malpractice claim involving pre-suit conduct before the
same judge who is also hearing the civil action wherein that very
malpractice is alleged to have made it far more difficult, if not
impossible, for a former client claimant or defendant to prevail.1B3
Consider, as well, the scenario where an insurance coverage dispute
between an insured and an insurer involving pre-suit conduct is

181. MAY 2014 AGENDA BOOK, supra note BB, at 319, 329 [State "preservation requirements may
be addressed to a wide variety of concerns unrelated to the current litigation," and
unreasonableness [or other culpability) under state norms does not necessarily mean unreasonable
"with respect to a particular case" in a federal litigation).
182. See supra, pts.111.B., 111.C.
183. See, e.g., Hardy v. McCorkle, 765 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. App. 1989) [In a divorce case, trial
judge could also hear claims for attorney's fees against one of the parties as well as that party's
counterclaim for attorney malpractice.). But see Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 643 (N.j. 1997) [no
similar compelled joinder required).
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presented in the same civil action wherein the insured has demanded
coverage on a claim that the opposing party pursues against it and where
settlement talks could then lead to settlements of all claims, though the
claims would likely need separate trials should settlement talks fail. 104

2. Jurisdictional, Venue and Joinder Issues
In the Boyd case survey of the varying forms of state spoliation
claims, the court encouraged joinder of those claims with the related
claims wherein spoiled information was lacking.1es It reasoned:
We also agree with plaintiffs that a single trier of fact may be allowed
to hear an action for negligent spoliation concurrently with the
underlying suit on which it is based ... A single trier of fact would be
in the best position to resolve all the claims fairly and consistently. If
a plaintiff loses the underlying suit, only the trier of fact who heard
the case would know the real reason why. This factor is important
because a spoliator may be held liable in a negligence action only if
its loss or destruction of the evidence caused a plaintiff to be unable
to prove the underlying suit. We therefore encourage plaintiffs and
the trial court to employ joinder in this case.1B6

But such consolidation may not be as easy in a federal court as in an
Illinois court due to different jurisdictional, venue, and joinder laws.
As to jurisdiction, there are significant barriers to joinder involving
both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Subject matter
jurisdiction would likely require general diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction, supplemental jurisdiction, or ancillary jurisdiction.1e1 In the
absence of one of these forms of statutory subject matter jurisdiction,
some federal courts may still exercise their power over state spoliation
claims. For example, federal courts have ancillary jurisdiction authority
not only over "claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually
interdependent"iee with already pending claims (often supplemental
jurisdiction claims), but also over matters that "enable a court to

184. See, e.g., Kelly v. Yannotti, 153 N.E.2d 69, 71-72 (N.Y. 1958) (holding that, though joined,
the tort claim against insured and insured's claim against insurer would have to be tried separately
if there were no settlements).
185. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1995).
186. Id.
187. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (general diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental
jurisdiction); Butt v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 999 F.3d 882, 886 (3d Cir.
2021) [ancillary jurisdiction over attorney fee disputes).
188. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994).
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function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its
authority, and effectuate its decrees."189
Should a spoliation claim fall within diversity jurisdiction, it is
difficult for a federal court to decline to exercise its adjudicatory
authority.19o If a spoliation claim falls within supplemental jurisdiction,
federal courts exercise broad discretion in declining to exercise
adjudicatory authority, even if the court previously recognized
jurisdiction.191 Ancillary jurisdiction precedents enabling a court to
function successfully also recognize discretion. For example, a federal
court can sometimes exercise settlement authority, that is, the court can
attempt to bring a related spoliation claim to an amicable end, even if the
court could not adjudicate the claim on the merits without a
settlement.192 Further, as with attorney fee disputes,193 federal courts
can hear spoliation claims after they resolves all related litigation claims
on the merits, especially ifit is a third-party claim.194
Personal jurisdiction barriers to joining spoliation claims in related
federal civil actions most frequently will appear with third-party
spoliation claims,1 95 that is, claims against those otherwise not named as
parties, as when expert witnesses, insurers, or lawyers are sued for
causing ESI losses. 196 Under federal procedural due process principles, a
prospective third-party spoliation defendant will need minimum ties to
the forum in the absence of forum residency, forum service of process,
consent, or attachable forum property.197
189. Id. at 380.
190. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) ("[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction."); Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (quoting Colorado River Conservation Water Dist v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)) (stating that federal district courts have a "virtually unflagging
obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction given them"). But see, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 282 (2005) (explaining comity or abstention doctrines may "permit" or
"require" a federal district court to stay an action "in favor of state-court litigation").
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
192. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. lndus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996) (holding that state
court approval of a release of a federal law claim over which the federal district courts have
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction must be honored when that same federal claim is later
presented in a federal court).
193. See, e.g., Butt v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 999 F.3d 882, 888 (3d
Cir. 2021).
194. With third-party spoliation, the effects of unavailable information due to third party
conduct (i.e., acts by one not involved in the other litigation claims, as with experts, insurers, or
lawyers) can be assessed; that is, the impact on the spoliation claimant's earlier claim loss(es) can
be determined.
195. For first-party spoliation claims (i.e., claims between existing parties who already have
other disputed claims in the pending action), "pendent personal jurisdiction" would often operate.
See, e.g., Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 88 (2d Cir. 2018); Action
Embroidery Corp. v. At!. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2004).
196. Supra notes 120-24.
197. See, e.g., lnt'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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Venue barriers to joining spoliation claims arise chiefly from forum
non conveniens analyses,190 in that the "pendent venue" doctrine can
obviate the need for independent bases for venue over any spoliation
claims.199 As with supplemental jurisdiction, discretionary decisions not
to hear spoliation claims can be made under forum non conveniens
analyses sometime after the commencement of litigation, though there
were no earlier venue concerns recognized.200
3. Federal Interests in State Substantive Spoliation Policies

Beyond the foregoing procedural laws on ESI losses pertinent to
federal civil actions, there seemingly are some federal substantive laws.
One involves ESI losses that prompt federal substantive spoliation
claims which preempt state spoliation claims. While federal claims likely
cannot be founded simply on breaches of the federal procedural
common law duty to preserve information, which can also serve as a
basis for sanctions (curative and noncurative),201 there can be imagined
federal substantive spoliation claims arising (directly or implicitly) from
written federal laws (statutes or agency rules) on information
preservation.202
198. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981).
199. See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS§ 3808 (West 4th Ed. 2021) (sometimes called ancillary venue);
see also Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 101-04 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that pendent venue
often prompts consideration of same factors as pendent jurisdiction, including "judicial economy,
convenience, avoidance of piecemeal litigation and fairness to the litigants"); Bredberg v. Long. 778
F.2d 1285, 1288 (8th Cir. 1985) (recognizing limits on employing pendent venue).
200. See, e.g., GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (recognizing thatthe factors
utilized in assessing a forum non conveniens dismissal include matters that may only appear once
the lawsuit has progressed for a while, including "relative ease of access to sources of proof," costs
associated with witness attendance, and "possibility of view of premises if view would be
appropriate").
201. I argued earlier for some comparable federal question claims for harms caused by federal
pleading abuses. Jeffrey A. Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal
Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325, 342-44 (1985). But such implied claims generally have gone
unrecognized in both federal and state courts. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293
(2001) (failing to recognize an implied claim arising from regulatory violation); Davis v. Findley,
422 S.E.2d 859, 861 (Ga. 1992) (failing to recognize an implied claim arising from a professional
conduct rule violation); Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 502 (Iowa 2017) (failing to recognize
an implied claim arising from professional conduct rule violation).
202. On implying federal law claims for federal statutory violations, see, for example, Cannon v.
Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 676, 680 (1979). One such written law may be 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), where a
person or entity alleges harm that is caused by an internet provider's failure to preserve ESI as
requested by "a governmental entity." The law has been described as follows:
The law states that Internet providers, "upon the request of a governmental entity, shall
take necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the
issuance of a court order or other process," about an Internet account The provider must
then preserve the records for 90 days, extended to 180 days if the government renews its
request. Since its enactment in 1996, this authority has been routinely used by investigators
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Federal question claims could also arise from contracts guided by
federal laws, as with agreements between private parties to preserve ESI
for future federal civil actions wherein federal court has exclusive
jurisdiction. Similarly, federal question spoliation claims could arise
from information preservation contracts between federal agents and
entities and private parties. In both settings, contracts might include
choice of federal law provisions.

D. New Laws on ESI Preservation and Protective Orders?
Should new approaches to ESI losses in federal civil actions include
new federal procedural laws on the availability of more pre-suit
preservation and protective orders?
Herein, pre-suit preservation orders include pre-suit orders
directed at potential civil case parties or witnesses on the creation or
maintenance of ESI that would otherwise not be made and kept; on the
continuing maintenance of existing ESI that would or might otherwise
be eliminated; or on the production to others of ESI that would
otherwise not be produced upon informal request Pre-suit protective
orders include pre-suit orders directed on behalf of potential civil case
parties or witnesses on the absence, or on the breadth, of any procedural
and/or substantive law duties to create, maintain, or produce (i.e., to
preserve) ESL
1. ES/ Preservation Orders

New federal laws on pre-suit information creation, maintenance,
preservation, and production could draw from the aforenoted state presuit discovery laws. Such state laws extend to orders beyond orders
under FRCP 27(a) and (c). While state goals in pre-suit discovery laws at
times go beyond information preservation (as with discovery aimed at
identifying potential civil litigants or potential causes of action), this
article only urges the need for ESI information preservation orders.
New federal procedural laws authorizing ESI information creation,
maintenance, preservation, and production orders by federal district
judges should be available both pre-suit and post-suit2D3 Pre-suit
to preserve the contents of e-mails, private messages, stored photos, and other online
contents.
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment Limits of Internet Content Preservation, 65 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J.
753, 754- 55 (2021).
203. Elsewhere, I argued, with Jessica Theodoratos, for greater authorizations of pre-suit
preservation orders. Parness & Theodoratos, supra note 19, at 685 ("New civil procedure laws
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preservation orders should go beyond FRCP 27(a). Post-suit
preservation orders should go beyond FRCP 26.204 New explicit rules on
ESI preservation would promote the goal of the 2015 FRCP 37(e)
Advisory Committee to reduce the "significantly different standards for
imposing sanctions or curative measures on parties who fail to preserve
electronically stored information."2os New rules would also diminish the
incentives to undertake "self-help" ESI collection in violation of federal
and state laws.206

should, at the least, authorize pre-suit court orders involving evidence preservation when the
evidence, relevant to possible civil litigation, will likely spoil otherwise and is subject to a
preservation duty under substantive law."). This led to my proposed FRCP 27 amendment on such
orders. Jeffrey A. Parness, Proposed Amendment to Federal Civil Procedure Rule 27(c): Federal Presuit Information Preservation Orders, SSRN 3745893 (Dec. 9, 2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3745893 (presented to the FRCP Advisory Committee on November 13,
2020; proposing that FRCP 27(c) explicitly recognize a court's power to entertain an action
"involving pre-suit information preservation when necessary to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive resolution of a possible later federal civil action").
204. FRCP 26(c)(1), on post-suit protective orders, is limited to requests from "a party or any
person from whom discovery is sought." FED. R. C1v. P. 26( c)(1 ). Such requests may only be available
long after a civil action was commenced since discovery usually may only be pursued after "the
parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(1)," with such conferences occurring "as soon as
practicable," but "in any event at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is to be held or a
scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b)," where such an order, absent "good cause," must issue,
per Rule 16(b)(2), "within the earlier of 90 days after any defendant has been served with the
complaint or 60 days after any defendant has appeared." FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(1), (f)(l).
For now, there is FRCP 26(d)(1) which allows preservation "orders" before any FRCP 26(1)
conference in very limited cases, including cases exempted from initial required disclosures under
FRCP 26(a). Rule 26(d)(1) supplies no guidelines. See also FED. R. C1v. P. 26(d)(2), which allows
preconference FRCP 34 document and ESI requests, but only more than twenty-one days after
summons and complaint are served. Perhaps, as well, FRCP 65 on temporary restraining orders is
available to secure post-suit ES[ preservation orders. FED. R. C1v. P. 65. Yet, even if available, such
orders require a showing of"immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage." Id. at (b)(l)(A).
205. FED. R. C1v. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
206. See, e.g., Xyngular v. Schenkel, 890 F.3d 868, 872, 875 (10th Cir. 2018) (dismissing a
corporate shareholder's claims due to pre-suit, bad faith evidence gathering). In state domestic
relations cases, one experienced attorney (and licensed private attorney and certified computer
forensic specialist) lamented about the prevalence of illegal ESI inquiries, noting:
This much is certain: matrimonial litigants often convince themselves that the key to a
successful outcome is getting their hands on their spouse's data, particularly emails, texts,
and other electronic communications. In an alarming number of cases ... parties utilize a
wide range of methods from hacking of email accounts, setting up auto-forward rules, or
accessing the spouse's iCloud through a separate (sometimes a child's) device, to the
installation of spyware programs on devices used by their spouse. Although there are
certain limited circumstances in which the exercise of "self-help" to collect Electronically
Stored Information ("ESI") outside of formal discovery by a spouse in a matrimonial case
may be legal, much of the conduct described above ... violates state and federal criminal
statutes, gives rise to statutory claims for civil damages, results in evidence that is
inadmissible by statute or case law, and can also result in direct and serious sanctions
against the offending spouse in the matrimonial action itself.
Nicholas G. Himonidis, Digital Espionage in Matrimonial Cases: Drawing the Line Between Legitimate
Self-Help and Unlawful Interception of Electronic Communications, 33 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW.
393, 393-94 (2021).
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2. ES/ Protective Orders

Both compliance and noncompliance with pre-suit ESI demands
carry heavy costs, leaving recipients with difficult choices. Similar
problems face those receiving post-suit ESI demands before beginning
ESI discovery where the recipients wish to be rid of the ESL Currently,
there are far fewer federal procedural law mechanisms authorizing presuit judicial clarifications on ESI duties than authorizing post-suit
judicial clarifications.201
New laws authorizing pre-suit and post-suit protective orders are
needed for those facing actual or potential pre-suit, or actual or potential
post-suit, ESI maintenance, preservation, and production requests. New
laws should, at least, allow potential civil litigants presented with presuit demands for ESI preservation, in anticipation of future (and perhaps
imminent) civil litigation, to seek federal district court assistance to
clarify their information obligations. New laws would lessen the need for
later discovery spoliation sanctions and state spoliation claims; prompt
more informed pre-suit and post-suit settlements; and, over time, foster
greater certainties about ESI information preservation obligations.
New federal pre-suit protective order laws could draw from the
aforenoted 2018 Arizona court rule on pre-suit avenues to resolving ESI
"duty to preserve" issues.20e The rule allows a pre-suit verified petition
"asking the court to determine the existence or scope of any duty to
preserve" ESI, where the petition, inter alia, is accompanied by a "good
faith consultation certificate": an identification of those the petitioner
anticipates may oppose the petition and of disputed issues following the
consultation; and, a description of any undue burden or expense on the
petitioner, including "an estimate of the expenses likely to be
incurred." 209 Yet any new federal laws on pre-suit protective orders
should be integrated with existing FRCP, like Rule 26(c). Further, any
new federal laws may require variations from the Arizona norms on presuit ESI duties should the FRCP 37(e) distinctions between ESI forms
(e.g., irreplaceable and replaceable) continue.
New federal post-suit protective order laws should be embodied
within an amended FRCP 26(c). Again, federal rule makers could draw
from the Arizona court rule on resolving ESI disputes related to pending
207. But see FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(1) (providing early post-suit "discovery" may be obtained by
court order). Further, consider possible post-suit interlocutory injunctions or orders under FRCP
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
208. ARIZ. R. C1v. P 45.2(d), (e).
209. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(e)(1).
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civil actions.210 That rule allows parties and nonparties to seek judicial
determinations of any disputes regarding ESI preservation where
earlier private dispute resolution attempts were unsuccessful. 211
Further, there are instances where new post-suit protective order laws
can be statutory. 212
V. CONCLUSION

There have been two major changes in the FRCP involving ESI
discovery during the John Roberts era. These changes primarily address
the duties to preserve ESI for federal civil litigation, the procedural law
sanctions that can be assessed for preservation failures, and the role of
substantive state spoliation laws in deterring and remedying lost ESL
While these changes were embodied in FRCP 37(e), its provisions have
always been accompanied by other FRCP provisions on ESI, some
predating Rule 37(e).
This Article reviewed the history behind, and all the current, FRCP
provisions on ESL Its primary focus was the Rule 37(e) changes which
took effect in 2006 and 2015, with a nod to the unadopted proposed ESI
changes of 2013.
The Article began by reviewing the FRCP as well as state
substantive laws applicable in federal courts to pre-suit and post-suit
ESI losses. State spoliation laws were reviewed as they might suggest
potential FRCP reforms, whether those state laws originate in tort,
contract, or elsewhere.
These reviews facilitated the exploration of several significant
issues regarding lost ESI pertinent to federal civil actions. These issues
include the uncertainties arising from the FRCP distinctions between ESI
and non-ESI, as well as between the varying forms of ESI; the challenges
in pursuing state spoliation claims in related federal civil actions; and
the possible need for new pre-suit and post-suit ESI discovery rules.

210. ARIZ. R. CIV. P 45.2(d), (e).
211. ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 45.2(d) (referencing for parties ARCP 26(d), and for nonparties ARCP 7.l(h));
see also ARIZ. R. C1v. P. 26(e) (instructing courts on how to determine whether ESI is "reasonably
accessible").
212. Consider, for example, statutory authority on protective orders against those subject to
preservation duties under 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(2) (While discovery is stayed in certain private
securities litigation, "unless otherwise ordered by the court, any party. . . shall treat all
documents ... and tangible objects ... that are relevant ... as if they were subject of a continuing
request for production ... from an opposing party.") where statutory violations very harmful to
petitioners are otherwise reasonably likely. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(2) (1998).
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